A Eurasian Contest of Wills: New Winds, but the Same Summons

Analysis

Wars and forceful stand-offs have regrettably become routine since the very inception of humanity, and continue, sadly, to be an ever-present addition to the rest of our mundane dealings. Some are fought on minor scales, whilst others involve entire territories and a multitude of mortals fighting for a "just cause". This is a pity, of course, but the struggle to promote one's own agenda and subjugate another's grew among the currents which began to crystallize with the advent of much higher stakes, and is nowadays encapsulated in the notion of geopolitics. This term, currently in fashion, essentially involves a ceaseless struggle to dominate large landmasses inhabited by tens of millions of people with different cultures, religions and philosophies of life on Earth. More importantly, with the dawn of modern technology, warfare and economic patterns, this ceaseless clash increasingly avoids all-out military confrontation, and is instead pursued in a more "hushed" manner with all the subtle tools of modern political thinking, science and industrial capacity and capability at one’s disposal. Considering the direct relevance of these criteria, the desire to dominate the vast Eurasian continent far exceeds in scale and importance all other geopolitical struggles, whether active or merely dormant, but the results, foreseeable or unexpected, of wielding power over the entire continent would surely be of fateful significance to the newly re-emerging world security order.

Unsurprisingly, the small number of geostrategic theories includes one, Mackinder's “heartland” theory, which is explicitly based upon Eurasia as a pivotal area, and holds that "Who rules the Heartland [Eurasia] commands the World Island; who rules the World Island commands the world.” Mackinder’s theory was further revitalized by Huntington's famous “clash of civilizations”—and here we are now, witnessing a clash of civilizations in that pivotal area, Eurasia.

Riding the Turf: Prime Actors

In the struggle for power in Eurasia, Chinese efforts to spearhead their signature “Belt and Road” initiative are definitely the dominant force. This is a network without precedent, a trillion-dollar project expanding westwards over both land (the Silk Road Economic Belt) and sea (the Maritime Silk Road), encompassing over 68 countries, 60 percent of the world's population and up to 40 percent of global GDP. The BRI does of course come with some clear political strings attached, but it tends to disregard negative external factors and projects are usually evaluated according to their potential impact rather than the viability and bankability of specific businesses. Above the (hidden) undercurrents of BRI rises the spiraling vortex of Beijing's "Go Out" policy, which seeks to ensure that Chinese construction firms “win” as many contracts as possible for international infrastructure projects. This same policy also helps to bolster the Chinese economy by providing outlets for excess industrial capacity—a crucial factor for stable domestic growth which, in turn, is directly linked to political stability.

Yet it is alarming that, by using "debt-trap diplomacy", Chinese foreign policy tends to neglect transactionality and ignore the economic, social and environmental consequences of certain infrastructure projects. The goal instead is to increase the country’s influence by providing loans. Objectively speaking, of course, lax project financing standards also often play into the hands of borrowers, as they impose fewer conditions in terms of respect for human rights, protecting the environment, accountability and other universally recognized obligations. The fact that this policy largely mirrors domestic lending patterns, which have led to a dramatic increase in local Chinese debt, can help us understand China's desire to lend money abroad—albeit with a major caveat: it is sovereign nations that are in debt to Chinese investments abroad. This "debt-trap diplomacy" appears to be a conscious effort to build political influence by discarding responsible lending principles and sound commercial rationale. To wit, China’s Export-Import Bank held negligible amounts of distressed loans in 2008, but by 2015-2016 this figure had jumped to over USD 5 billion a year, and it continues to increase. As for the China Development Bank, the Ministry of Finance injected roughly USD 50 billion in cash to maintain the bank’s capital adequacy ratio (a measure of its solvency) at minimum levels. The borrowing end also experiences additional backlashes, as the availability of Chinese investments can lead to cronyism and resource curse.

The truth is that the West is losing its leadership of Mackinder’s Eurasian "Heartland" to China, and that the Sino-centric order is expanding throughout the “World Island". This is worrying in many ways, and one can also plausibly argue that, if successful, the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (sometimes referred to as “China's Marshall Plan”) would make China a powerful force for economic and political integration in Eurasia. Besides, its success would strongly align with Xi Jinping's "Chinese Dream" policy (or "China First", whichever suits the reader better).

Russia's efforts to create and strengthen the Eurasian Union by reconnecting former Soviet states economically (and militarily via other networks) can be seen as an attempt to fend off Chinese plans for the region’s gradual integration. In any case, Moscow's efforts are aggravated by the need to “combat” US influence along the entire length of Russia’s western borders. The country would like us all to believe that Eurasia falls within her sphere of privileged interests, and the Kremlin has actively defended this Russian concept of a "near abroad" by attacking Georgia and Ukraine. Yet the current impasses between Russia and the West on one hand, and Russia and China on the other, promise to be of different calibers.

The former, presumably, would be less intense as a result of America’s gradual retrenchment, which began under George W. Bush and has led to an absence of clear policies towards Russia and Eurasia under Trump. In addition, the US remain rather lukewarm towards NATO, regardless of recent upticks in assertiveness in the statements of various high-ranking officials. And besides, with new challenges to classic Cold War deterrence, Russia feels less constrained by the niceties of international law and is almost free to deal with her Eurasian neighbors as she pleases, working to increase her stature on the world stage. It is fair to mention, though, that this aversion to a rules-based system is not risk-free, as it cannot quite ignore the possible risk of confrontation with the West. This could also quite well be the case with certain US defense and security programs in some of Russia's neighbors (particularly in Georgia), but overall it must be admitted that US policy towards Russia's "near abroad" remains in limbo.

As mentioned above, the impasse between Russia and China is quite different in nature. Above all, Moscow considers Beijing’s actions in Central Asia to be intruding in its "sphere of privileged interests". An imminent clash between the "privileged" interests of both parties brings a note of irony to various initiatives—from strictly bilateral co-operation agreements to proposals for broader and more inclusive co-operation in Eurasia. The latter include the “Greater Eurasia" project, which calls for the creation of a network of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements between the Eurasian Economic Union, China, India, Pakistan, Iran, CIS members and other interested countries, but most importantly may give Russia the chance to establish herself as an “Atlantic-Pacific” power. All in all, it seems to us that whilst China will continue for the time being to be on the offensive in Eurasia through the BRI and associated programs, Russia will remain a major Eurasian power but one on the defensive, clinging on through the Eurasian Union and affiliated platforms.

Having Their Say, Too

The US and India (yes, India) are rightfully thought of as legitimate contenders for the geopolitical dominance of Eurasia, yet they cannot be considered as being quite in the same “class” as China and Russia for a variety of reasons.

In the struggle for the continent, India enjoys the advantages of a vast geography, of an enormous population, of a huge diaspora and of a large and dynamic economy. The country plays an active role in various multilateral institutions, and never loses sight of the wider foreign policy picture. Currently, however, Indian concerns are mostly related to Chinese dominance, and for the time being are mainly emerging to the east of the Eurasian corridor, as Beijing's programs threaten to undermine India's "Act East" and "Connect Central Asia" policies. Chinese maritime expansion into the Indian Ocean further adds to Delhi’s unease—not to mention the $62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project, which is also the cause of India's reluctance to join the BRI due to her historical rivalry with Pakistan. In any case, India’s Eurasian policy seems much less one-sided than China’s and more oriented towards working within international organizations: India, for example, helped to set up the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and now ranks as its second largest shareholder. But despite positioning herself very close to US policy, India, like China, is unwilling to meet American expectations of the future regional setup which the West would like to see in place. At the same time, however, serious constraints currently prevent India from being a primary contender in Eurasia—primarily the country’s somewhat limited economic capacity and an inadequate military-industrial sector. Because of these limitations, India may find it very difficult to break free from the bonds of her neighborhood and actively follow a Western trajectory. Having said that, we believe that in the foreseeable future India will mainly act as a super-regional power on the eastern flanks of Eurasia, and that her key priority (especially if building her bilateral relationship with US will require greater Indian leadership in the Pacific region) will be seeking to limit China's rise in the New Asian Order by at least trying to undercut Beijing's efforts to establish the Maritime Silk Road component of the BRI. India’s traditional policy of non-alignment might be an alternative to greater foreign policy efforts in Eurasia, but can perhaps be discounted given Indian ambitions—even if these are some way ahead of the country’s current capacity to pursue a bigger and bolder foreign policy.

Washington is seemingly losing its grip on its own, US-centered model for Eurasia—at least in appearance, following the adoption of a reinvigorated policy of “America First”, which is in itself proof of the current administration’s increasingly selective interference in urgent global issues. Given the wide range of "caveats" in the Trump administration's foreign policy (many of which have already been discussed in greater detail in previous articles), both the strength and inclusiveness of America’s Eurasian outreach remain unclear. The recent National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS) can, however, offer some insight into the matter. Whilst the NSS speaks of a “principled realism that is guided by outcomes, not ideology", naming China and Russia as challengers to "American power, influence and interest" and underlining Europe’s “vital importance to the United States" (as the western end of the “Heartland”), the NDS refers to the need to “deter aggression in three key regions—the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and [the] Middle East”. And yet US links to the Indo-Pacific region are considerably weaker than they were during previous decades, and US policy in the eastern part of the Eurasian continent has become much more "concessionary" in nature—favoring either regional setups (quite unlikely, though, under the Trump presidency) or relying more heavily upon bilateral partnerships (e.g. the US-India relationship). All in all, and despite having proclaimed a "pivot to Asia", the US will have to limit themselves to maintaining their role within the fluctuating geopolitical system of western Eurasia and supporting various liberal strongholds by fortifying the transatlantic alliance. This trend within the Free World of "sliding back" seems to be heralding the birth of new global "order" which will swing pendulum-like between the extremes of multi-polarized, centrifugal and irrationally-led policies.

Georgia: Destined to be a Prisoner of Geography?

The Eurasian contest of wills forces small nations such as Georgia to choose between two major readings. On one hand, centuries of experience of playing foreign powers off one against another, attempting to gain or maintain a purely national sovereignty based upon political and economic benefits, point to the extreme precariousness of following such a policy. One must also bear in mind that no international system can function viably enough unless it includes the largest and fastest-growing countries, even if the latter are fierce competitors amongst each other. If Georgia, despite the risks, wishes to follow the former path, that will require a great deal of sophistication, knowledge and luck; if, on the other hand, she chooses the latter, then working hard to include the country in collective systems of economic co-operation and security would be a useful way of building enough geopolitical importance for the country to be in a position to make positive, meaningful contributions to certain matters. With that in mind, the NATO summit in Brussels will have be a real game-changer if it is to break the seemingly eternal bonds of Georgia’s geography.

By Victor Kipiani