China’s View of Eurasia
Analysis
Throughout history there have been many cases where a certain power tried to bring large parts of the Eurasian continent under its fold. The Achaemenid Empire in antiquity, the Mongols and Tamerlane in the Middle Ages, and many others worked prodigiously to create a unified Eurasian space. Beyond the military preponderance though, these invaders could not provide clear economic or cultural attractiveness for the various peoples of the Eurasian landmass. The result was more or less a rapid disintegration of their conquests. The Russians from the 16th century, on the other hand, embarked on a project where they gradually built an empire with a clear philosophical approach to its role in world history. Strong Russian military was backed up with relatively attractive economic incentives for the peoples of Central Asia, the Caucasus and parts of Eastern Europe.
One of the ideologies underpinning the Russian drive to dominate Eurasia was Eurasianism, an almost century-old idea which emerged as a distinct philosophical movement in the 1920s. There are multiple definitions of Eurasianism, but the most vocal among them is the definition whereby Russia is regarded as representing neither European nor Asian cultures, but rather is a perfect mixture of the two. The Eurasian doctrine in general meant a specific geographic and philosophical identity for Russia. In the Soviet period, Russian Eurasianism was overshadowed by communist universalism where direct Russian influence was encouraged to spread not just to Eurasia but everywhere around the globe. The current Russian government tries to re-invigorate the notion and attractiveness of Eurasianism, but has so far largely failed to do so since the new integration project dubbed “Eurasian Economic Union” is not a powerful enough entity to compete with Europe or Asia-Pacific.
Russia’s long-term integration idea/project for the Eurasian landmass was arguably the most successful until 2013, when the Chinese government unveiled a new Eurasia-wide economic and political idea seen in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
The Chinese focus on connectivity and integration across Eurasia distinguishes it from Russian Eurasianism as the latter failed to counter western economic, cultural and military encroachment into what was previously considered “the Russian backyard.” The BRI, on the other hand, is based on strong economic potential as well as solid institutions, seeking cross-continental connectivity and integration between China and Europe. Unlike Russian Eurasianism, the Chinese version would eventually challenge what is provisionally called Atlanticism, where the US has built a security-based umbrella across the entire Eurasian landmass to prevent the emergence of a unified Eurasia.
Chinese Eurasianism will allow Beijing to gain additional foreign policy tools against the US, which pressures China in the Asia-Pacific region. China’s pivot to the West goes primarily through Central Asia, a region which is militarily dominated by the Russians. The US has little capability to prevent China from increasing its influence in the region. This puts Beijing in a relatively good geopolitical position in bargaining with Washington. The US will have to dedicate more economic and militarily resources to counter the Chinese, which will ease up some pressure in the Asia-Pacific.
Since domination of the oceans is at the heart of US global power, the Chinese initiatives to restructure the Eurasian landmass through economy is bound to increase suspicions between Beijing and Washington over the next years and decades.
In the long run, this is more problematic for the US than what it had during the Cold War. Then, the Soviets were competing militarily, and no large or long-lasting economic projects were offered by Moscow. True, the US had to spend plenty of its military and economic resources to stall the Soviet influence, but the Soviet threat nevertheless remained only one sided in its military. The attractiveness of Communism was non-existent, the Soviet economy was in a shambles, and in the long run, it was predictable that the US would win the Cold War race.
Today, China, with its powerful economic incentives, represents a much bigger threat to the US-led Eurasian order. China, Iran, Russia and others, countries pivotal to the Eurasian landmass, and Washington, enjoy pretty tense relations which limits America’s power to prevent an alliance of convenience between several anti-American countries.
Overall, the Russian vision of the Eurasian landmass is being gradually overshadowed by the Chinese vision. China as a continental power sees the advantages of moving through Central Asia and the Middle East to Europe, and Moscow does not possess the necessary capabilities to oppose Beijing.
By Emil Avdaliani
Photo: Visit to the Admiralty building in St. Petersburg by President Putin 30.7.2017 Source: kremlin.ru