Georgia’s Western Path is Unlikely to Change
Op-ed
Georgia’s geographic position makes it one of the focal points in the struggle over the borderland region between Russia and the West. Georgia’s history and especially the country’s foreign policy over the past 25 years or so has been intricately related to this struggle, where NATO/EU aspirations are central.
The strategic change came to Georgia after the 2003 "Rose revolution" when the Georgian government became openly pro-Western by declaring its course on Euro-Atlantic integration. Close partnership was forged with the United States. Military as well as economic support gradually increased, culminating in 2009 when Georgia and the US signed a Charter on Strategic Partnership.
Although Georgia's bid to get a Membership Action Plan was rejected in April 2008 at the Bucharest NATO summit, the Alliance declared that Georgia, along with Ukraine, would eventually become members of NATO. Russia was nervously watching Georgia’s progress, while, at the same time, Ukraine too experienced upheaval: the Orange Revolution. Moscow had to act and chose to move by ratcheting up tensions in Samachablo (so-called South Ossetia), one of Georgia regions which claims independence from Tbilisi. This resulted in the war of 2008 between Russia and Georgia and subsequent recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and so-called South Ossetia, followed by the deployment of military bases there.
After the 2008 war with Russia, the NATO-Georgia Commission was established, and Annual National Programs were developed under the auspices of the Commission. At the NATO Wales summit, leaders endorsed the Substantial NATO-Georgia Package to help Georgia in its efforts to improve its defense capabilities.
Thus, relations with Russia within the existing geopolitical frame, with Georgia moving towards Western institutions, remained strained.
The new government of Georgia which came into power after the October 2012 Parliamentary elections, has also made efforts to further increase its NATO/EU bids. However, what has been different this time is the willingness to build better relations with Russia. The Russian government also made some steps towards normalization. In 2013, Georgian wines were allowed to re-enter the Russian market, and in May 2014, Russia opened its market for Georgian fruits and vegetables. In November 2012, the Georgian Prime Minister appointed a special envoy for relations with Russia. Bilateral consultations with the Russian deputy foreign minister were launched to discuss problematic issues. Nevertheless, beyond these initial diplomatic and commercial steps, there was no willingness on either side to concede their respective geopolitical agendas. Moscow refused to loosen its grip on the breakaway territories, while Georgia only strengthened its pro-western aspirations.
Georgia and the West: The Russian View
Georgia’s western drive is very much a part of current Georgian-Russian relations. Indeed, over the past several years, there have been plenty of discussions going on in analytical and political circles in Georgia on how far normalization could go between Russia and Georgia. Many believed that economic activity could be perceived as an initial step towards gradual rapprochement. However, when compared with the geopolitical constraints hindering any improvement, it is clear that Moscow and Tbilisi share some fundamental differences in foreign policy.
Georgia’s intention to integrate into the EU and NATO goes against Russian interests. I have written before that for Russia, Georgia’s NATO aspirations are problematic, but integration into the EU is far more crucial and long-term for Russian decision-makers.
Russians fear that there is a definite shift among the Georgians towards the benefits of the European economy, education and military capabilities. Tbilisi and Moscow might sincerely wish to improve bilateral relations, and there are reasons for this. The resolution of security issues in light of terrorist activities in the region would benefit both countries. Economic prospects, as noted in the beginning, too might drive the countries to work more closely. Russia’s geographic proximity to Georgia forces the latter into economic relations. Moreover, the non-existence of diplomatic relations as well as fundamental differences regarding Abkhazia and Samachablo does not stop the Georgian government from creating closer economic contacts with Russian businesses.
However, beyond that, it gets difficult to ascertain any additional factors for potential cooperation. Russia’s military strategy does not have any room for Georgia’s NATO/EU integration. Moscow wants Tbilisi to reverse the course of its foreign policy, a nearly impossible task for any Georgian government as it would result in a public backlash, strong European and US reactions and wider geopolitical ramification in the region such as undermining of the natural gas corridor running from Azerbaijan to Turkey.
Russia’s foreign policy in the South Caucasus is based on clear geopolitical imperatives. We deal not necessarily with the anti-Georgian government of Vladimir Putin, but rather a well-thought out strategy on the Russian part as to how to effectively project its military power into the region. This would also mean that any new government in Moscow would very unlikely to cause a change in Russian foreign policy towards the South Caucasus. It is in Russia’s vital interests to keep Georgia at least unstable. On the opposite side, the loss of Georgia to the West would mean a rapid decrease of Russian power, with much wider ramifications for the entire former Soviet space. “Russia-free” Georgia is a nightmare for Moscow, as the Kremlin would then be less able to pressure Azerbaijan on export routes. Moreover, the Caspian energy corridor would again see its relevance and Central Asian gas could reach Europe.
On a much larger geopolitical scale, it could be argued that Georgia is pursuing a clever strategy of positioning itself not as an anti-Russian state, but also not abandoning its pro-western course. The ideal scenario for Tbilisi would be when all the neighboring countries have a stake in the security of Georgia. Large players, such as China with its Belt and Road Initiative, the EU, Russia, the US and others involved in the economics of the country might create a certain geopolitical balance in the region.
Overall, it could be argued that Georgia is pursuing a clever strategy of positioning itself not as an entirely anti-Russian state, but at the same time also not abandoning its pro-western course. From a historical perspective, the Georgians nowadays are doing what they were accustomed to doing in earlier centuries: playing one big state against a powerful neighbor. For the Georgian mind, the geopolitical challenges emanating from Russia are similar to what was seen with the Byzantines, Sasanians or later on Ottomans and Persians. Back then, the Georgians played one against the other.
Tbilisi’s strategy has worked so far, as nowadays, although militarily strong, Russia is constrained in its actions by the US and European influence in Georgia.
At the same time, when pondering the future of Russo-Georgian relations, one might think that whatever limited cooperation Russia and Georgia have, it will not mean a rosy picture for the future of Russia-Georgia relations. Moscow is very unlikely to give up on its policy towards Samachablo and Abkhazia, while Tbilisi will remain principled towards its territorial integrity.
By Emil Avdaliani