Political Europe: a Reality as We Know It?
This country continues to follow the path of European integration as tirelessly as ever and despite the strong buffeting of many different headwinds. The road is frequently bumpy and the driver occasionally sloppy, with the inevitable wrong turns and detours, but the passengers can look back to some very notable milestones such as the Association Agreement with the EU and the visa-free regime with the Schengen Area.
Oddly enough, however, and somewhat controversially, the more mature and all-embracing this process of integration becomes, the more the timing of its end-result becomes uncertain. The EU-Georgia Association Agreement gives Tbilisi practical means to bridge the gap by harmonizing its institutional, business and regulatory legislation with that of the EU. This is a demanding process that periodically puts the country under great strain as it attempts to leave its clumsy political past behind and adopt European policy-making standards.
But are we absolutely sure that the political Europe is precisely the one we see when we travel there for business or pleasure? Is the European ‘polity’ an exact extension of the Europe we witness when paying for gifts at the cash desk? Does Europe’s political structure correspond to the consumer-driven sophistication we experience when we sip at a cup of coffee in a cosy European-style café? Does it really mirror the same welcoming feeling that guests from politically un-European countries usually feel when strolling through the cheerily decorated streets of EU capitals?
The soundness of Georgia’s European political choice is beyond doubt, but let us measure the progress the country has made and the remaining distance more realistically. We should also formulate our own ‘realpolitik’ towards political Europe by accurately identifying the strengths of our bargaining position as well as what is to be given up or accepted in return. To adopt this new approach is to admit to ourselves that the European ‘polity’ ceased to be an idealistic motivation some two decades ago, and that, prompted by a surge of populism, egocentrism and the European elite’s ‘splendid isolation’, it has surpassed the boundaries of romanticism more visibly of late.
Overall, the EU seems to be losing its political and economic integrity and increasingly to be turning towards transactionalism. This transactional approach is vividly reflected in the EU’s dealings with matters such as the expansion of political Europe beyond its eastern members to the new nations that technically, geographically and culturally speaking also share a common European history and civilization. It would be highly expedient for us, Georgians, to rediscover Europe with its political, institutional and structural foundations, to gauge how complex the reality is and to identify exactly where we neatly fit into the overall European political architecture. It is also time to base the process of our European integration on a more realistic and results-oriented premises, e.g. by asking ourselves how we can make use of some of our ‘inner’ European affiliations to our advantage? How can we avoid becoming trapped in the numerous current that in the long run are eroding the European feeling and spirit?
Alliances and Groupings
Georgia remains committed to joining the EU, and its efforts continue to be as unflagging and irreversible as ever; various legal and operational instruments it has introduced are a clear testament to this process. But at its end, the EU is increasingly being torn apart by internal frictions and fissures such as fiscal disunion, political discord and the refugee crisis (to name but a few). As a result, and as we mentioned in one of our earlier articles, Brussels can nowadays be likened to a ship attempting to navigate the almost impassable straits between the Scylla of its ailing economic union and the Charybdis of its frail political union. The prospect of Georgia becoming a member any time soon is consequently becoming dimmer by the day, but the more pressing issue is the need for Georgia to formulate and adopt an idiosyncratic approach to the question in response to Europe’s ‘volte-face’.
At the same time, we should also be sufficiently astute to afford Europe’s core members the respite they need to fix some of their internal problems and possibly rework their enlargement policy. Yet occasionally pausing efforts to push the Georgian and European ends together should not, however, harm the process of Georgia’s rapprochement with the EU, nor should it discredit the latter in the eyes of the aspirant country. Hence the need for interim but nonetheless ground-breaking institutional arrangements for the painless transformation of inner Europe into a wider Europe. Among the strategies that have been proposed in this regard is that of a so-called ‘two-tier EU’ that would allow existing member states to retain exclusive access to key spheres of security, foreign policy and fiscal and monetary matters without undue interference by second-tier member states aspiring to become fully-fledged members of the Union at some future point. In return, the latter group would have a say in the re-constitution of a new union of truly European nations in genuine partnership. (See ‘Georgia's New European Modus Operandi’, The Financial, 6 March 2017.)
Although a new modus operandi such as this could seem highly controversial and somewhat unrealistic, existing formulas could also be used as ‘short cuts’ on Georgia’s road towards EU integration, with Tbilisi being granted all the requisites of a near-full political membership. One of these short cuts could be further deepening Georgia’s ‘EU membership’ by co-operating even more closely with EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe, and in the Baltic-Black Sea ‘Intermarium’ in particular. The growing importance of the latter is linked to its re-emergence within the overall Euro-Atlantic security design, as set out in the conclusions of the recent NATO summit.
Primarily envisaged as a buffer zone made up of former Soviet satellites (the Baltic states, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria), the Intermarium concept is gaining wider meaning as a means to parry the designs of a revisionist Russia. Georgia’s profound engagement with the region is doubly important since the latter is formally part of NATO and is the most economically vibrant part of Europe (although some countries of the Intermarium do not belong to the Eurozone).
This concept therefore presents Georgia with a good platform from which to enter ‘inner’ Europe—particularly considering the possible expansion of the Intermarium into the so-called ‘Three Seas’ model. Also known as the Baltic-Adriatic-Black Sea Initiative, the Three Seas model aims to be a useful geopolitical instrument capable of unifying the EU’s Eastern European members in the fields of logistics, connectivity, infrastructure and energy.
When considering different formal or ad hoc groupings of Central and Eastern European countries, Georgia should be mindful of those which may not always fall in neatly with its own strategic course, and must carefully scrutinize the advantages and disadvantages they present. For instance, possible groupings include the ‘16+1’ platform, a multilateral framework set up by Beijing to reach out to and co-operate with 11 EU member states and 5 Balkan countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Presented as a ‘win-win’ extension of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, ‘16+1’ is nevertheless seen by various analysts as a means whereby Beijing can pave the way for Chinese bank loans and implement its global infrastructure push on a bilateral basis. In a nutshell, the platform’s Central and Eastern European members stand to lose their collective bargaining power, with those having accepted Beijing’s largesse being forced to acquiesce in China’s official agendas and policies. This process undoubtedly needs to be watched carefully by all the stakeholders involved.
Although both the Intermarium and Three Seas model are ideas rather than established systems, they may be worth considering should Tbilisi wish to rationally and responsibly time its progression towards EU membership according to solid increments rather than rapid and improvised (and sometimes unrealistic) policies. Besides, by grouping Georgia with other (like-minded?) Eastern European countries, either model could perhaps give Tbilisi a competitive edge of sorts in its dealings with Europe’s inner ‘polity’.
European Powerhouses
Notwithstanding the role of major amalgamations of European states, with the EU surely being the most important of these, a few ‘singular’ states can exercise a dominant, quasi-veto power when EU accession policy is discussed. These stalwarts undoubtedly include Germany and France, as has indeed always been the case throughout European history, and have a powerful say when it comes to key matters of the European agenda. Driven in part by the immigration crisis, Europe has begun to split into Western and Eastern parts according to two very different appreciations of ethnic and cultural diversity. Various controversies, triggered by frictions among and between the ‘imitated’ (Western Europe) and the ‘imitators’ (Eastern Europe), have undermined the Europeanization process—not to mention the further eastwards expansion of Europe’s political and monetary union. Besides, Russia’s patent meddling in European affairs makes it more difficult for the EU to preserve its political and economic cohesion, let alone pursuing further eastwards expansion.
It is true that France has adopted a more assertive tone under Macron. Along with his heralding of the ‘beginning of a new momentum’ for the country, this assertiveness has also had extensive foreign policy implications, as France seeks to play a greater role among efforts to further the European agenda. But this new-found will seems to be crumbling rather rapidly these days, undermined by disagreements with other member states over the future of the Union (and with Germany in particular over the level of solidarity of EU fiscal and monetary institutions). These differences of strategic view weaken France’s ability to compromise while furthering European integration, and hinder the process of non-member Eastern Europe countries discussing their EU integration, political or otherwise.
Germany's foreign policy is also clearly changing under new foreign minister Heiko Maas. For decades, the country’s foreign policy was driven by both the West (the United States) and the East (Russia), and began to tilt more westwards under Merkel. What is particularly noteworthy under Maas, however, is the rebranding of Germany’s traditional Ostpolitik into a ‘New Ostpolitik’ that, while taking into account the needs of all Europeans, argues strongly in favour of more co-operation with Central Europe and holds that ‘the experiences and perspectives of the countries of Eastern Europe beyond Russia must also be factored [in]’ (Maas, addressing the Romanian Ambassadors Conference on 27 August 2018). Notably, Berlin’s New Ostpolitik is foreseen to be based on the ‘Trimarium’—an alternative name for the Three Seas Initiative—as well as upon the strategic importance of Central and Eastern Europe (particularly considering reborn rivalry in and over the region) and the belief that Germany’s relations with countries of the region should be more independent, and not always necessarily entertained through the EU.
Irrespective of the rather bleak prospects—largely due to our own transitional bumps and the EU’s innermost pitfalls—of our becoming fully politically integrated with Europe any time soon, it is obvious that Georgia’s progression towards Europe must not slow down, and that the country ought to press on incessantly through a combination of various formulas for ‘getting there’ and by complementing established patterns with improvisation and accommodation.
Furthermore…
Georgia should without the shadow of a doubt continue to do its homework according to the Association Agreement, and do so assiduously and patiently. Tbilisi clearly has to further broaden the format of its co-operation with EU institutions, increasing the country’s presence and visibility on European stages, and must keep a close eye on the emergence of new initiatives (e.g. PESCO, a treaty-based framework to jointly develop defence capabilities and make them available for EU military operations). We must examine and make use of every new possible point of entry to Europe, but we should not forget that even if we successfully follow the letter of various treaties and instruments, doing so may still fall short of Europeanizing the spirit of the process.
We need more ‘Europe in Georgia’, and a policy should be carefully designed and deployed to persuade the boards of European businesses to decide to establish branches in the country. This is reminiscent of Lee Kuan Yew’s From Third World to First, which recalls the concerted efforts of Singapore’s leadership to attract world-class businesses, an injection of much-needed human capital and expertise that ultimately set the scene for the territory’s remarkable economic growth. Identical or similar idiosyncratic and unorthodox patterns must be applied to our case as well. Expanding on the question of human capital, one of our national priorities should be to send students and professionals abroad for them to obtain the best education and training possible and usher world-class knowledge and expertise into various strata of society once back in Georgia. Nothing can help bring Georgia closer to Europe more than investing in people and talent. Words, however solemn the declaration may be, are not enough to ensure our Europeanization: what is needed is action and the persuasive and physical demonstration of our dedication and determination.
By Victor Kipiani
Image source: mapswire.com