Russia to Return to Mass-Mobilization?
Various comments in Russian media over the past year show that the Russians are again set to return the concept of mass-mobilization. This is a very-well known concept in Russian history, seeing almost every section of the population, as well as every sector of the state economy, geared for a military emergency. However, while in other cases in world history mass-mobilization took place only when a military situation required, in Russia, mass-mobilization is almost a state policy.
In the imperial period (until 1917), the Russians were called upon to serve in the army in both peaceful and military circumstances. Those national drafts were easy to discern as most of the European states in the 19th century pursued the policy of drafts.
By the mid-20th century, the USSR had attained almost a perfect level of mass mobilization, which allowing the Soviets to rely on larger human resources than its archenemy the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Soviet mobilization reached a level where the state was able to sustain up to five million troops in peacetime. In times of threat, the Soviets could even call up to 6-8 million reservists.
Today, Russia is again considering going back to the mass-mobilization concept. True, the drafts system has not been abrogated since the break-up of the Soviet Union, but there have always been various groups within the government which advocated changes to the military conscription and therefore to mobilization. In many ways, the Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008 and before that the Second Chechen War in 1999, showed that a Russian (-based on Soviet) military system is no longer efficient. Reforms started, but none have gone so far as to change the Russian mass mobilization concept.
Moreover, the Russian government of late has been making various contradictory statements and policy moves on conscription and the civilian industry role in war time, suggesting a behind-the-scenes struggle among various factions in the economic and military sectors.
A slide towards mobilization is well seen in the strategic exercise Kavkaz 2016, held in southwestern Russia in September. It was a turning point. According to the chief of the Russian General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, the Russian Armed Forces for the first time tested mobilizing reservists. Also for the first time since the end of the Soviet Union, Russia’s industrial enterprises were checked as to how they could operate in times of military emergency.
What is more important in this development is the fact that mass mobilization requires enormous financial resources and a steady growth in the population.
Ironically, Russia lags behind in both of these sectors. Economically speaking, mass-mobilization and subsequent military costs have always killed Russia’s economy. What happens in Russia nowadays is almost identical to what happened in the country’s past. Russia’s history is in many ways a cyclic one. In the last years of the Soviet Union, by the late 1980s, the Soviets were fundamentally lagging behind the West in technologies and other important sectors of the state. Oil prices were low and there was high demand for a viable reform, despite the fact there was a distinct abundance of resources to move the country forward. Still, those financial and natural resources were spent on huge military apparatus and the development of deadly technologies. The result, predictably, was the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
Going further back into Russian history, in the early 20th century, just before the outbreak of World War I, there was a clear demand within the government and the country’s elite for reforms in social and economic spheres of the empire. However, this was also a period of militarization in Europe, with clear signs of the upcoming world conflict. While politicians disagreed on the militarization, still Emperor Nicholas II chose to spend large amounts of money on quick and fundamental militarization. At a time when developments showed how backwards (in comparison with western European countries) Russia was economically and militarily, spending on the military would certainly spell a catastrophe for the government. This indeed happened in 1917, when the Russian Revolution broke out.
Thus, a slide towards mass-mobilization in Russia in many ways means that the current Russian government has added yet another problem to its already large pool of fundamental troubles. This may well have deteriorating impact on the internal situation in the country in the coming years.
By Emil Avdaliani
Olga Maltseva/AFP via Getty Images