NATO Membership: a Georgian “To be, or not to be”?
During the build-up to nearly every NATO Summit—and the forthcoming one in London this autumn is of course no exception—many ordinary Georgians and academics debate (crystal ball gazing?) the country’s prospects of the Alliance finally granting Tbilisi an entry ticket. This practice has become a habit since the well-publicized (but ignominiously never-kept) promise of membership expressed during the 2008 Bucharest summit. That said, these debates—which beyond Georgian shores also exist on the opposite side of the Atlantic community—have the merit of at least being intellectually stimulating. Setting aside the question of Georgia's prospects for membership, they provide various shapes and schemes to enrich the intellectual design of the great power struggle that is currently blooming. When one adds the subtlety of previously unknown types of warfare and struggles for influence, the scope of these debates is expanding remarkably quickly, encompassing new points and features appearing on radar for the first time. The novelty and boldness of this intellectual experimentation also stimulates us whenever we muster the courage to delve into ongoing discussions and look at various angles of this process in a "risk-averse" manner.
Strategic Patience, or Else?
As we have often been told about the need for strategic patience when considering Georgia's formal accession to the Atlantic community, the question that arises is what is the practical meaning of such patience, and for how long must it last? This question seems simple, but we fear it has no plain answer. Besides, what is to be done in practical terms when this strategic patience turns into strategic passivity—or worse, strategic ambiguity? By notably increasing the uncertainty of NATO’s eastwards expansion, the 2008 Bucharest Summit sent positive but mixed signals to Georgia's hostile neighborhood, encouraging some countries to increase their efforts to inflate power struggles and to place Tbilisi’s sovereignty and integrity at ever greater risk. Indeed, agreeing to exercise ‘patience’—especially a ‘strategic’ one—would definitely appeal to a variety of stakeholders, facilitating the upwards spiral of threats and hostile acts and making it difficult for us to identify or design effective countermeasures in the new quagmires of our neighborhood and broader region. At this point, one should repeat that the aggression and occupation of Georgia and Ukraine is not about some "mishaps" in the “near abroad” of a revisionist Russia, but instead bear the clear and undeniable mark of a strategy to erode the Alliance’s Eastern European flank. In addition, given the clumsiness of attempts to manage "gray area" conflicts in the context of international law and order, this strategy is subjecting the resilience of the West and its eastern allies to an increasingly stringent stress test. Besides growing fissures in the Alliance, American efforts to maintain a common security system with their European allies are also being undermined by their own misgivings regarding the desirability of the current US policy of upholding an extended deterrence, i.e. protecting not just the United States but also their allies. This ambivalence is even stronger when it comes to the question of whether or not to protect allies that are not formal members of the Euro-Atlantic security system but are nevertheless closely linked to it in one way or another. In cases such as this, the complexities of the so-called “Senkaku Paradox” come into play: should the US and her allies rigorously defend their interests in certain countries or regions by risking a major conflict with a rogue or revisionist power in order to preserve their reputation and credibility? This moral conflict is a sheer calculation of costs vs. benefits. To put it plainly, should the Atlantic community run real risks over something that is relatively unimportant compared to the higher stakes of global stability? Or would any failure to respond to violations of international law be inconsistent with their attempts to preserve their unity (or at least the semblance of it)?
Strategizing is a great thing, of course, and strategic objectives are good provided that they help, at a minimum, to deter threats and challenges. However, when strategizing turns into a "strategy for patience"—entailing in turn a number of complex questions regarding the precise nature of such patience, how long it must be exercised and what it must achieve—this simply supports the status quo rather than prompting real and much coveted changes through transformative diplomacy (e.g. the recent statement by former NATO Secretary General Rasmussen or the proposal by Luke Coffey at the Heritage Foundation). And in the Eurasian contest, such “patience” backfires by diminishing the Alliance’s strategic depth and inviting aggressors to encroach upon its own “heartland”.
The Unity of Civilization: A Necessary Reasoning?
We must all remember (and remind those who forget) that Georgia’s NATO membership is not an end in itself, merely adding to the Alliance’s rank and file, but is also (and more importantly) a civilizational choice. Our vision is clear and our choice is irreversible: Georgia rightly belongs to Western civilization, with which it is fully entitled to formally reunite. The country is not "torn" between different foreign policy trajectories: a general consensus is perfectly identifiable, and this public support reflects that of both the country’s political elites and civic grassroots. We may also opine that the major disagreement, typical of "post-Soviet" countries, that opposes liberalism to the “ethno-state” now appears to have been resolved, and that Georgia’s mainstream political foreign trajectory aims for openness and integration instead of a “noble seclusion”. And besides, we see ourselves as belonging to the camp whose members value human rights, freedom and dignity over state interests, unlike "sovereign" or "governed" democracies (not to mention overtly authoritarian regimes) that privilege the latter instead.
Although a "clash of civilizations" should clearly be not viewed as an absolute, decisive and flawless facet when trying to understand our world, it still seems to make sense when “new normals” emerge and when practical policy-making is increasingly incapable of crafting an honest, right and helpful conceptual rationale.
Along with existing feedback, past experience indicates that sanctions and other means of economic warfare by the West are in themselves insufficient to accomplish their stated objectives. Instead, an either direct or indirect military build-up along defensive perimeters adjacent to the opposite camp eventually becomes inevitable (time and cost permitting, of course). Maintaining political and cultural commonalities throughout the whole Western family of nations requires real efforts to support national economies and security among the family’s most vulnerable and critically exposed members.
Do we need a "Plan B"?
Most likely yes. While continuing to expect NATO to make hopefully meaningful and timely decisions, Georgia should not be complacent, nor should external actors who realistically acknowledge what is happening in the region continue to procrastinate (or is it "appease"?) when pondering substantive matters. These could include reinforcing the existing defense cooperation between the US and Georgia, raising it to the highest level of partnership by signing a bilateral defense treaty (e.g. South Korea, Japan, etc.). This bold decision would require political courage, but the idiosyncrasy of the "new normals" leaves too little time for a slow and stately progression. Time is now indeed of the essence, and expectations must be converted into realities. Besides, engaging in such a process would in no way undermine the fabric of NATO: it would on the contrary match the Alliance’s overall objectives along very specific defensive perimeters.
In addition to underpinning Georgia’s development, a bilateral arrangement such as this would also correspond to the possible switch of US foreign policy to an "offshore balancing", and would complement judicious and proportionate levels of engagement with the international order in significant areas of the world. Also, by maintaining an "extended deterrence" it would add fresh vigor to the system of US-led alliances, and would eventually contribute to efforts to strengthen the stability and steadfastness of the rules-based international order.
A "Waiting Status"?
The reality in the so-called "gray areas" bordering the Russian Federation is a clear testament to the radical shifts taking place in the region, and heightened tensions in the Middle East and the implications of China’s “Belt and Road Initiative” are adding to the conundrum. That said, the over-reliance of Western democracies on economic measures and levers may well fall short of reaching goals. Along with geo-economics, maintaining the necessary degree of flexibility when working out military entanglements (either through a "fresh look" at NATO expansion or by promoting bilateral defence arrangements) will be equally important. A new "Unity-of-Free-Nations" may well also require some kind of Marshall Plan for such nations to pursue every means of effectively countering the ascendancy of revisionism. It would also require political leaders capable of taking meaningful decisions and seeing them through unflinchingly. The point is not to show generosity but to respond adequately to the geopolitical momentum and grasp its essence. It is about Western civilization having a decisive impact upon developments in the Black Sea region and supporting the right cause. And last but not least, Georgia’s "blood, toil, sweat and tears" and monumental struggle to maintain her freedom of choice must be properly valued.
By Victor Kipiani