Georgia's Foreign-Policy "Great Game": a Multifaceted Coin
Discussions delineating the most suitable foreign policy route for Georgia appear to be never-ending. Further, the threat of major conflicts flaring up across the region, pending instability and threats along our borders which are "moving through creeping annexation", the Trump world order and weakening pan-European cohesion add serious and sometimes insurmountable obstacles to efforts to predict Georgia’s foreign and security policy. That said, however, we see a greater need than ever to take a fresher look at gauging and giving contours to our own "Grand Strategy".
Neutrality: Cliché vs. Reality
The neutrality paradigm has been discussed before, but the issue deserves deeper and indeed more sober and unbiased deliberation—especially in light of a new wave of interest in the Georgian neutrality option. While discussions over the pros and cons of being a neutral nation were previously confined to the domestic policy-making arena and "talk show bragging" on local TV channels (regretfully, the depth of "savvy geopoliticking" is still measured by glimmering televisions screens), waves of overt Russian aggression into neighboring states and direct interventions far beyond its borders have pushed international experts to resuscitate a seemingly defunct concept of neutrality in an attempt to work out a formula to rein in this very new author of a global disorder.
A recent article by Michael O'Hanlon at Brookings specifically considered a neutral status for Georgia (along with Ukraine) and suggested a certain recipe for a would-be-neutral nation. To avoid Moscow opposing the Western order, the author speaks of the situation being counterproductive in Georgia as a result of continuing NATO expansion, which makes the country even more exposed to its mighty neighbor and gives Putin "an incentive to stoke trouble with Ukraine and Georgia because any ongoing disputes invalidate their near-term eligibility for NATO membership." He recommends a "broad agreement" between NATO, Russia and "the neutral countries of Europe" whereby NATO commits itself not to expand any further and Russia commits to "leave the neutral countries, withdraw military forces from their territories, allow them to join whatever diplomatic and economic groups they want (including the European Union), and stop arming and abetting separatists in places such as the Donbass region of Ukraine and northern Georgia." This is the way in which the author considers the “doability” of a multi-purpose agenda, starting with de-escalating existing tensions and promoting "the security and prosperity of the neutral countries in Eastern Europe". All in all, O'Hanlan’s view is to "seek to negotiate a new security architecture" whose "core concept would be permanent neutrality, at least in terms of formal membership in treaty-based mutual defense organizations."
This doesn’t seem like such a bad deal at all, but although there are some historical parallels there are very few successful examples. Among them is Austria’s 1955 State Treaty, which re-established the country as an independent nation, resulted in the withdrawal of Soviet occupation, and declared Austria as a country free from Western and Soviet interference. There are, however, a number of historical and practical restrictions to the likelihood of being able to successfully follow a policy of genuine neutrality these days.
Adopting a historical perspective, let us begin by observing that the concept of neutrality has become blurred over time and that it has lost some of the distinguishing features it used to enjoy.
First and foremost, the legal framework of neutrality is obsolete, and related norms are primarily enshrined in the 1856 Declaration of Paris, the 1907 Hague Convention V (neutrality in land war) and the 1907 Hague Convention XIII (neutrality in maritime war). The dates of these international legal instruments speak for themselves.
Secondly, our daily reality is of course radically different from the period which preceded the First World War, when neutrality was shattered by the invasions of neutral Belgium and Greece. The consequences of the Second World War rendered neutrality even more impractical: the nature of warfare had by then changed to such an extent that it made maintaining an absolute neutrality practically impossible, primarily due to the use of economic means of warfare, and the possibility of calling for coercive measures by virtue of the UN Charter and the requirement of taking military measures against aggressors lessened the substance of neutrality even further.
Even if one sets the question of the legal framework of neutrality aside, many stumbling blocks remain on the road to reaching a politically-based consensus in a world characterized by bitter division, conflicting agendas, and constantly shifting marriages of political or economic convenience—all of which have the power to eventually water down the very fundamental prerequisites of a stable world order.
Last but not least, O'Hanlon himself, when discussing neutrality, admits that "at one level, there is no guarantee" if and when something goes wrong and Russia violates its commitments.
The notion of "bufferization" as a form of neutrality can be replaced with a nicer, fancier synonym—which brings us to the next topic.
Finlandization: any different from Neutrality?
Finlandization is "the challenge of surviving as a small nation in the shadow of a larger one". It basically means allowing a smaller nation to maintain its internal independence, political system and democratic freedoms, but imposing a series of rules upon its foreign policy.
The idea, which is also known as the Paasikivi-Kekkonen doctrine, primarily involved Finland rejecting NATO membership and the Soviet Union abandoning its efforts to include Finland in the Warsaw Pact.
Essentially speaking, Finlandization is a different term (if not a disguise) for a neutral buffer nation placed between two rivals—more specifically two contiguous rivals with territorial claims. This may not exactly be the case with Georgia (Turkey formally acknowledges our territorial sovereignty whereas Russia is completely opposed to it), but when it comes to rivalry, one may still assert that such rivalry does in fact exist if one views Georgia as a buffer between Russia and NATO. Allegedly, buffer status may help cement national cohesion, but it also poses a meaningful threat as Finlandization—as a form of "bufferization" between two rivals—is likely to commit the neutral state to "being the battleground over territorial disputes for generations".
Given these different understandings of the overall meaning of Finlandization, in Georgia's case it is of course necessary to point out that the doctrine bears some clear-cut innate and perhaps unresolved controversies.
One of the key elements of Finlandization is giving up the possibility of NATO membership. This is the minimum comfort threshold for Moscow, and is well understood. Equally, by accepting EU membership (as is the case with Austria), a member country also agrees to join the EU’s defense system. In other words, although denied the possibility of becoming a member of one military alliance, a "Finlandized" nation, in addition to collective economic, trade and investment arrangements, also gains access to another, similar alliance. Co-operating on defense with the EU, most of whose members are simultaneously members of NATO, clearly entails a rapprochement with NATO standards and sub-components.
Russian occupation leaves Georgia no other choice than to search for defense guarantees—the most reliable of which can most likely only be provided by NATO. Any outright formal rejection of NATO membership should be substituted by security guarantees of no lesser quality, a question which is also related to levels of trust between the parties involved. With Russian troops stationed in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, speaking of sufficient levels of trust between Georgia and its mighty neighbour to the north seems irrelevant. With that in mind, any alternatives to NATO are inseparable from the restoration of Georgia’s territorial integrity, the latter constituting Georgia’s minimum comfort threshold for any semblance of trust in Moscow.
When speaking about the doctrine of Finlandization, its most prominent supporters do not deny the need to supply military matériel to Finlandized nations in order to prevent them being easy prey for external aggressions. But then again, any appeal for such a military build-up may run against a key party’s expectations of a "broad agreement".
A separate point to consider when speaking of the possibility of Finlandizing Georgia is the historical context, which is of course very different from that of Finland in 1948. At that time, Finland was of secondary importance within the fabric of wider confrontation between the West and the USSR, and Helsinki’s merely formal guarantee not to join NATO was acceptable to the Kremlin. Nowadays, with the growing geopolitical importance of the Black Sea and Caspian regions, the need to bind a "safety belt" around an unpredictable and aggressive Russia, and the emergence of existential threats in the Middle East, Georgia is irrevocably becoming a central security element, both in the region and beyond. The surge in importance of the Black Sea and Caspian regions is leading the country towards greater integration with NATO and, arguably, more than ever towards formal membership.
In our view, Finlandization is a substitute meaning for the notion of neutrality; there is a lot of overlap between the two and, conceivably, thinly visible discrepancies which become even more blurred when put into practice.
Even though the doctrine of Finlandization is inextricably related to a legacy of bad feelings following the surrender of certain elements of national sovereignty, it may still be discussed as a pragmatic and temporary form of status quo to check the desires of revisionist powers. For those more inclined to sing the doctrine’s praises, it could reasonably be described as a means of dealing with mighty and eccentric states and encouraging them to rein-in their hegemonic urges and adopt more peaceful forms of co-existence with their smaller neighbors.
“Hedging” geopolitical bets
At first glance, geopolitical hedging is different from the practice’s financial or economic forms, and rests upon an unarticulated and ambiguous foreign policy. Yet this ambiguity is intentional and serves a clear purpose: by leveraging increases or decreases of ambiguity, a state can send a clear message that it is diversifying its foreign vectors by considering various, if not divergent, geopolitical interests crisscrossing its territory. When hedging its foreign policy, a state attempts to make secondary bets on two or more conflicting geopolitical interests while maintaining good relations with both by talking to all major stakeholders individually (or in groups) about possibly aligning its interests with those of others. In other words, achieving a balance through hedging requires formally adhering to any major player "in the hope of avoiding both domination and abandonment". In practical terms, geopolitical hedging is reflected through an increase in self-defense capabilities and stronger regional co-operation and alliances. And besides, as we mentioned, it must accommodate (within certain limits) the interests of external rivals—especially when respective intentions are unclear.
The term "hedging" is a relatively new concept, but the practice has pedigree. The history of the emergence and formation of new states in the Arab world following the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire provides some good examples of how hedging was an integral part of the state and institution-building efforts of Syria, Lebanon, Iraq or Transjordan as a direct consequence of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. More recent examples of hedging can be seen in Japan, South Korea and Singapore, who are betting equally on maintaining their good relationships with the United States while avoiding any risk of damaging their business ties with China. Interestingly enough, some hedging tactics are also clearly noticeable in Europe, where various political leaders, in light of allegedly weakening US interest in NATO, are attempting to portray the European continent as a balance between US and Russia.
Hedging tactics may be especially appealing to Georgia, considering its location in a volatile region and the unpredictability of the times, subject to Tbilisi having a few key prerequisites for their effective use.
To begin with, there needs to be a solid understanding of "centers of strength" and "centers of influence" as a result of deliberate expertise and contact monitoring. And yet such an exercise, in our view, faces two critical obstacles: the obscure "moving pieces" of the emerging new world order, and Georgia’s insufficient professional knowledge and expertise.
Next, and this is unquestionably a must, is a strong interpersonal diplomacy, as successful foreign deal-making and achieving one’s ends relies upon charisma, leadership and team skills. Again, this largely remains an open question.
All in all, any reliable, security-driven foreign policy requires a set of capabilities, but hedging is truly an art of its own.
NATO: a Happy Ending?
Apparently, Georgians deem membership of a military block (and particularly NATO membership) to be the most promising of the country’s current options. This should come as no surprise, as this membership—instead of being equated to increased protection and defense—is strongly associated with a set of values which Georgians believe they share. Regardless of the recent change of ruling party, the country shows remarkable perseverance as it vies for closer and more substantial co-operation with NATO on the path to its goal of fully-fledged membership.
On top of the very practical measures which the country has taken and continues to pursue come a series of definite and undisputable decisions such as the referendum on joining NATO held on 5 January 2008 or the Parliamentary Resolution on the Main Directions of Georgia's Foreign Policy adopted on 7 March 2013.
Georgia’s persistence and almost self-sacrificing commitment is "echoed" by ongoing disarray both within the Alliance itself and among its member states, largely as a result of the recent US presidential elections. Although the new administration has now to some extent restated its loyalty towards the North Atlantic Treaty and has recanted its accusations of “obsolescence”, it still remains to be seen how far the process of US retrenchment from its hitherto pivotal role will go. We obviously need assurances that the Trump administration will never actually implement a policy of US offshore balancing and that a liberal hegemony, based on shared security, will ultimately prevail. Equally important is the need for some European nations to stop their attempts to reform Europe’s security architecture—attempts which are often reminiscent of the infamous policy of "appeasement” which led to disaster in the 1930s.
Georgia's NATO aspirations and her desire to become a full member of the North Atlantic structure is all about making two ends meet, since the Georgian end alone cannot provide sufficient reward for all the difficulties of this painful process. We certainly expect the other end to take more robust and unequivocal steps, and any "murky waters" to be cleared.
Parting Note
This article is a testament to the fact that there can be no easy solution to the sensitivity of foreign policy matters, and that there are no ready responses to the newly resurfaced problem of how to deal with the domination of revisionist powers or with externally goaded domestic instability. What is obvious is the need for a deeper, more sophisticated and more multi-dimensional analysis in which immaturity or amateurism is simply not tolerated. When the results of such an analysis will be crystal-clear—having been properly “SWOTed” and duly deliberated at an institutional level—it will then be a case of following up in practice with all the dedication and professionalism that addressing national security challenges requires.
Victor Kipiani