Russians & the East-West Highway

Several days ago, it was announced by InterpressNews that Russian troops had resumed fortification efforts along the demarcation line of the breakaway region of South Ossetia. According to the InterpressNews correspondent’s report, the armed troops installed another so-called demarcation line green banner alongside the villages of Bershueti and Sobisi. This move saw several families losing several hectares of their land used for cultivation. According to a number of estimates, and as the statement by the Gori Governor Davit Tsertsvadze testified, the new demarcation sign was installed some 500 meters further into Georgian-controlled territory.

If this information is true, in one section the Russian troops are now just 400 meters away from the major east-west highway which cuts across Georgia and is of major importance to the region as it connects Azerbaijan and the Black Sea littoral.

I wrote on Russian military moves in the breakaway territories a few weeks ago. But let’s revisit the issue as we now have a clearer picture on what the Russians are up to. As you drive along the major east-west highway about 80 kilometers (50 miles) north of Tbilisi, which connects Azerbaijan with the Black Sea ports of Batumi and Poti, at some points there is a demarcation line less than one kilometer to the north. The Georgians call it the “borderization” and it is managed jointly by Russian troops and separatists from South Ossetia.

The latest demarcation line movement attests to the fact that for the Russians, the demarcation line in South Ossetia poses a significant challenge as there are few geographic barriers the Russians could rely on to build a veritable defensive line. The fences zigzag across low mountainous area and small rivers, making it uncomfortable to defend from a purely military posture. From time to time, it is reported that the Russian troops have moved the demarcation line southward. Moreover, much of the boundary is actually without a fence.

Although the border’s movement might seem uncontrollable, one explanation behind it could be the geography of the territory: small hills, open valleys, etc. No veritable military infrastructure can be found along the demarcation lines. Thus, the Russians are moving southward to find a defensible territory.

Another side to the recent move by the Russians could be a much more important factor: bringing the demarcation line closer to the major east-west highway (Baku–Tbilisi–Kutaisi–Poti). As said above, if true, this will be the closest the Russians have come to the highway since 2008. The Russians see that by cutting the highway, they will be able to paralyze the entire South Caucasus. Furthermore, another threat which the Russians are posing is their artillery’s proximity to strategic pipelines and railways that carry oil, natural gas and goods from Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea to Europe. Cutting this communication line would leave the region defenseless. The Russians did this in 2008, during the Russo-Georgian war, when they occupied Gori, a city in central Georgia on the east-west highway. The country was paralyzed, as was the entire region.

Indeed, now considering the latest Russian move, Moscow’s longer-term perspective could be explained in much simpler terms: control or imposition of threat to strategically important infrastructure in Georgia which connects the entire South Caucasus region.

Another interesting aspect to this demarcation line movement is what can actually be done in order to forestall further Russian moves. It is very unlikely that the Georgian government will take any military measures to stop the process as it will further endanger the situation on the line. The east-west highway is as important to Georgia as it is to other countries such as Azerbaijan and Turkey. Moreover, as I wrote recently that even China, through its One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative, is interested in keeping the route safe for its assets and plans for the future.

But are these imperatives of the neighboring countries enough to constrain Russian moves? It is unlikely as neither Azerbaijan nor Turkey will want to field its military presence in order to keep the road open and safe. The Trilateral Format which exists among Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan has a strong military aspect to it. However, this cooperation has not yet reached a level where the three countries will take on the obligation to defend vital energy and road infrastructure in the South Caucasus. This, in turn, limits effective countermeasures to Russians being at a close range to the east-west highway.

Emil Avdaliani