Commemorating the Fall of Sokhumi

GEORGIA TODAY takes an in-depth look at the moment that Georgia will never forget.

History of the Abkhazian Conflict

The collapse of the Soviet Union precipitated a host of conflicts on its former territories. The 1992-1993 Georgian-Abkhazian war is arguably one of the most consequential, unresolved, and deadliest of the lot. The exact number of casualties has been hard to prove, but it is estimated by the Red Cross that as many as 15,000 lives were lost, while other sources claim that this is only half the real figure. The war also resulted in the displacement of a quarter-million people.

The roots of the conflict can be understood through the prism of the different nationalisms of the Georgian and Abkhazian people, and the consequently parallel but differing national liberation movements and narratives that were taking place at the time. As Ghia Nodia, Georgian political analyst, explains: “The modern Georgian national project is that of a classical nation-state: based on the idea that ‘we only want what belongs to us, but what does belong to us, we will never give up.’ Abkhazia is part of Georgia because it was always part of Georgia when Georgia was united. …The national project of the Abkhaz was not directed primarily at political independence … its main task was to ensure the survival of the Abkhaz as a distinct ethnic group…. to create a separate Abkhaz identity rooted in the western Caucasian region”.

Back in the days of Stalin, many ethnic Georgians were forcefully resettled in Abkhazia, which led to increasing Abkhaz fears for the loss of their homeland. To that end, in 1956, 1967, and 1978, Abkhazian leaders petitioned the Kremlin to remove Abkhazia from Georgia and incorporate it into Russia. However, instead of agreeing to these demands, Moscow gradually began implementing a host of preferential policies towards the Abkhazians, which by the tail end of the 1980s resulted in them enjoying a higher standard of living, and the most powerful political positions in Abkhaz hands. This inequality increased the ethnic tensions between the Georgian majority, who by 1989 made up 45.7% of the population, and the Abkhaz minority (17.8%), in what was then known as the Abkhaz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR). While there had been historical precedent for said movements, the chaotic break-up of the Soviet Union and the resultant policies of the Kremlin allowed for these historical tensions to boil-over into armed conflict.

In the years until the eruption of hostilities in 1992, a so-called ‘war of laws’ took place between the Georgian and Abkhaz Supreme Soviets as each sought to undermine the other’s authority. In December 1990, hardline separatist Vladiszlav Ardzinba, (‘president’ of Abkhazia until 2005) was elected as chairman of the Abkhaz Supreme Soviet, further sowing the seeds for conflict as his hostile relationship with Georgian nationalist leader and soon to be first President of Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, elected in the 1991 election boycotted by Abkhazians, threatened to push things over the brink. In August 1991, in an effort to defuse tensions, a power-sharing deal was agreed for the composition of a new Abkhaz parliament based on ethnic quotas, where the ethnic Georgians that made up the vast majority of the local population were guaranteed 26/65 seats to the Abkhaz’s 28. Alas, Tbilisi’s backing for this arrangement would not last long as a mutiny in the National Guard forced the Georgian President into exile in December of that year, with his position assumed by Eduard Shevardnadze.

In May 1992, levying accusations of discrimination, a boycott was initiated by the Georgian deputies in the Abkhaz Parliament, and a Georgian strike in Sokhumi was begun. Consequently, the Abkhaz Ministry of Internal Affairs, Tbilisi’s last remaining outpost of authority in the region, was attacked by Abkhazia’s National Guard. On July 23, without the Georgian deputies, a resolution restoring the 1925 Abkhaz constitution and the province’s status as a sovereign public (within the former Soviet Union) was passed by the Abkhaz Parliament. Full-blown conflict erupted on August 14 when the Georgian National Guard was sent into Abkhazia to retrieve hostages that had allegedly been taken there (three days earlier, forces loyal to Gamaskhurdia in Mingrelia kidnapped the minister of the interior and the national security advisor, amongst others). The hostage mission turned into combat between Georgian and Abkhaz forces defending Sokhumi as the former’s tanks entered the city. It is believed that Abkhaz forces first engaged their adversaries in Ilovi, 50 kilometers from their capital. Ardzinba denied Georgian claims that he was notified of their intentions to enter Abkhazia.

It is estimated that up to 5000 Georgian troops headed for Sokhumi while a further 1000 landed in Gagra in the northwest to seal off the Russian border. The Abkhazian resistance was a lot stronger and more determined than initially anticipated, and heavy fighting broke out in Sokhumi and the surrounding area, with a temporary 3-day ceasefire coming to an end on August 18 and the retaking of Sokhumi by Georgian forces together with the fleeing of the Abkhaz leadership to Russian military base ‘Gudauta’. Indeed, it seemed as if Tbilisi had prevailed, prompting Shevardnadze to declare that “Georgian authority has been restored throughout the entire territory of the republic”. The achievement of this goal, however, proved problematic, as Alexandros Petersen, Southeast Europe Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, explains: “tactical objectives … seem to have been to secure the main northwest-to- southeast road running through Abkhazia… to seal off the mountain passes to the North Caucasus. These… were never met, resulting in a resilient Abkhaz resistance able to move about the territory, as well as a steady stream of North Caucasian fighters moving southwards to supplement it… On September 3, talks between Shevardnadze, Yeltsin and Ardzinba were held in Moscow where the Abkhaz leader signed a document authorizing the presence of Georgian troops in Abkhazia. The talks fell through, however, when Abkhaz forces recaptured Gagra in October 1992”.

Hostilities continued with the civilian population bearing the wrath of fighters from both sides, as villages were regularly burned and looted, and their inhabitants slaughtered or taken hostage. In November, the Abkhaz forces began their siege on Sokhumi, and by February 1993, Russian planes had started bombing the city while Gamsakhurdia’s Zvidiast militia began assaults on the back end of Georgian forces. Finally, on July 27, 1993, the end seemed to be at hand as another Russian-brokered ceasefire brought an end to hostilities, with the subsequent withdrawal of Georgian soldiers from Abkhazia. Believing that the war was over, Georgian civilians returned to Sokhumi. Alas, it was not to be, as the Abkhazian forces broke cease-fire agreement and recaptured Sokhumi on September 27 with their largest offensive yet, leading to the expulsion of 250,000 Georgian civilians into Georgia proper, and the near wholesale ethnic cleansing of the Georgian population of Abkhazia.

Geopolitics of the Abkhazian Conflict

Decades have passed since the conflict and Russia (which played a dubious role in the early 1990s fighting) is now only increasing its influence over the breakaway region, denying any possibility of compromise between Sokhumi and the central government in Tbilisi.

Russia emerged little during the initial phase of the conflict, but looking at this in hindsight, one could tell that, overall, Moscow’s attitude towards the fighting was no different than in other conflicts across the former Soviet Union. In other words, if Russia has had a grand strategy in its foreign policy realm, it certainly involves the purposeful creation of conflict zones and their management throughout the post-Soviet space.

For the Russians, the fall of the Soviet Union was indeed the biggest geopolitical setback for Moscow, but keeping 11 buffer states around Russia has remained a cornerstone of the Kremlin’s foreign policy against Western influence. Politicians in Russia clearly saw that because of Russia’s low economic potential, the South Caucasus states would inevitably turn to Europe. And it can be rightly said that Russia has been fomenting and managing the Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria and east Ukraine conflicts in the last 25 years to deny Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine their pro-western aspirations.

There is a number of reasons why Moscow has been supporting breakaway Abkhazia. For Russia, Abkhazia is one of three major routes through which Moscow can physically enter the South Caucasus region. Two other routes are the Roki Pass in South Ossetia (Samachablo); and the one along the Caspian Sea coast from Dagestan to Azerbaijan. Russia has consistently dominated the three routes over several centuries, and when threatened with western encroachment, it has been open to using military force just as it did in 2008 when there was a real possibility of Georgia moving closer to NATO or, more generally, to the EU.

The control of the Abkhazian route allows Russia not only to quickly deploy its forces in the breakaway region but, in case of urgency, also threaten Georgia’s entire Black Sea coast. Remember what happened in 2008 when Russian forces entered Poti and other Black Sea locations? Moscow understands that without control over Abkhazia (and South Ossetia), it would have been simply shut off from processes in the South Caucasus. Thus, this projection of military power serves the basis of Moscow’s foreign policy whereby NATO powers are quite hesitant to engage Moscow directly.

We talked about the geopolitically important Abkhazian route. But there is also another aspect which facilitates the Russian presence in the breakaway region. Unlike South Ossetia, Abkhazia is in a much more comfortable geographic position. Where South Ossetia lacks natural barriers to defend it, Abkhazia, by contrast, has the buffer of the Enguri River. To the east there is the Kodori Gorge, a narrow passage which serves as a natural division line between the breakaway territory and the rest of Georgia. Thence comes the difficulty to prevail militarily over Sokhumi which, like South Ossetia, hosts approximately 5,000 Russian troops. This would largely explain why the Russians are not moving the demarcation line in Abkhazia deeper into Georgia: there is simply no need to do so.

Another reason for fostering the separatist regime in Abkhazia was to get hold of the military infrastructure built in Abkhazia during the Soviet period. Little is known about it, but some of the facilities are of great value.

Overall, support for Abkhazia aims at constantly pressuring the Georgian government by ramping up or cooling military activities in the breakaway region. Georgia will always be interesting for Moscow due to its geographical position in the South Caucasus. And it is not only about barring Tbilisi from joining NATO or the EU: Russia’s goal historically has been to minimize the importance of the Caucasus mountain range as a barrier between the South Caucasus and the Russian mainland and Abkhazia is one of the ways to implement this policy.

At the same time, Moscow has been clever enough not to strengthen Abkhazia too much to avoid Abkhaz nationalism and at times even openly anti-Russian feelings. Moscow does much to minimize Abkhazia’s internal stability. The idea is to provide the ruling politicians with money, while also boosting opposition forces to stage manifestations and even cause resignations. An example of this complicated situation is the return of Ankvab to Abkhazia several months ago. Raul Khajimba’s government, fearful of a reaction and not strong enough anyway, were unable to forestall his election as PM.

Moscow is closely watching the developments in the region as there are always elements in Abkhazia which do not agree with being entirely pro-Russian. Many fear that Russian money will leave ethnic Abkhaz without land. Unlike South Ossetia, where the population numbers are quite low and political life cannot become violent, in Abkhazia, for Russia, it is more prudent to have a divided political spectrum; a divided society where neither of the sides can gain the upper hand as a policy which will help Moscow hold off any anti-Russian sentiment gaining momentum. This, in the longer run, will help Russia to further its military and economic influence on political life in Abkhazia.

Russian support for Abkhazia is deeply rooted Moscow’s geopolitical calculations not only towards Tbilisi, but the wider South Caucasus. This is Russia’s geopolitical imperative and Moscow will continue pursuing this narrative further as western influence in the former Soviet Union increases along with pressure on Moscow.

Emil Avdaliani & Mate Foldi