Assessing the Russian Power across the Post-Soviet Space

Op-Ed

Since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Belarus has remained closely aligned with Russia through various Russia-led economic and political integration projects. Minsk joined the Customs Union, later transformed into the Eurasian Union, and remains an active member of CSTO. Belarusian leader Alexander Lukashenka, who has ruled the country since 1994, due to suppression of opposition parties and free media outlets, was sanctioned by the West. This, along with heavy strategic importance Moscow has been putting on Belarus, made Minsk largely attached to Moscow both economically and security-wise.

However, disagreements between the countries have grown as Russia has experienced a resurgence in power over the past 10 or so years, reflected in the invasion of Georgia in 2008 and facilitation of the separatist conflict in east Ukraine since 2014. Belarus started to feel worried about the prospects of bilateral relations as the Ukraine crisis unfolded and there are concerns that Russia would not withhold from undermining Belarus’ sovereignty (if “necessary”) in future.

Thus in order to balance Russia, Belarus started its rapprochement with Europe, and Brussels even lifted some of the sanctions against the Belarusian economy and different high-level officials. Minsk has even been adamantly against calls from Moscow to open a new Russian military airfield in Belarus. There are even disagreements over how the Eurasian Union operates as Belarus is worried that Moscow is using the economic union to advance its political aims. Even CSTO’s work was questioned. Since the military alliance has not been used preciously, it is often considered merely a symbolic organization.

Moreover, Belarus and Russia also often have disputes over energy prices, transit issues, and Minsk has at times been quite critical of Russia’s foreign policy towards the neighbors. For example, Minsk, despite pressure from Moscow, did not recognize Georgia’s breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Lukashenka also voiced criticism of Armenia, Russia’s long-time ally in the South Caucasus, over its policies in Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan’s breakaway territory.

But, despite all these disagreements over a range of issues, Belarus also needs Russia. Russian investments as well as trade are predominant in Belarus. In the security realm, Belarus shares Russia’s concerns that NATO forces are moving too close to the Russian and Belarusian borders.

Moreover, Lukashenka’s rule has many similarities with that of Putin. Both are holding on to power for too long and are widely criticized for it. Both have been facing countrywide protests over the past year and are positioning themselves as strongmen.

So, when we talk about Lukashenka’s overtures to the West and the chances of changing the sources of Belarus’ foreign policy vector, his wish to hang on to power should also be taken into consideration. Although these are quite strong arguments, there are even larger geopolitical reasons which underpin Belarus’ attachment to Russia and the latter’s interests in projecting its power over its western neighbor.

From Russia’s perspective, Belarus’ geographic position makes it an important piece of land to project economic and political power in. Belarus’ location on the North European plain has made it through the centuries an avenue for foreign invasions of the Russian mainland. Charles XII of Sweden, Napoleon, and Hitler in XX century all directed their Russian campaigns through Belarus. Nowadays when the EU and NATO have made considerable headway into the former Soviet space by signing EU association agreements and holding military exercises with Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia, Russia perceives it no less a danger than the abovementioned historical figures.

Moreover, Belarus not only borders on the core Russian territories, Russian mainland, but also industrially and economically important regions such as Pskov, Bryansk, Smolensk and others. More importantly, Belarus is geographically very close to major Russian population centers, most notably the Russian capital Moscow.

Keeping Belarus under its influence also gives Russia the possibility to project its power far beyond the current Russian borders deep into the Central Europe and the Baltic states. Belarus borders on Poland and Lithuania, both members of NATO and unequivocally anti-Russian in their foreign policy stance. Moreover, as Russia grapples with the ongoing Ukraine crisis, Belarus’s position has become doubly important as it borders on North Ukraine and is very close to Kiev.

Thus, Belarus’ geographic position would largely explain Russia’s interests and its foreign policy moves.

However, like in Ukraine, alongside pure geopolitical calculus, there is also a cultural aspect to the significance Belarus bears for Russia. Belarusians are the Russians’ Slavic brethren and the country, like Ukraine, represents an integral part of Russian history. For the steadily decreasing Russian population, keeping almost 10 million Slavic Belarusians is an important asset.

Belarus and Russia will continue facing challenges in bilateral relations. The issues will range from security realm to wider political issues. Still, both countries will remain deeply aligned with each other. Russia will continue to be a major economic power for Belarus, while Minsk’s rapprochement with the West will not cross the red line whereby Russia feels it has to step in to safeguard its strategic interests in the western borderlands.

Emil Avdaliani