Assessing Russian Power across the Post-Soviet Space, Part IV: Tajikistan

Russia and China vie for economic and political influence in Central Asia and Tajikistan has been a testing ground for their indirect economic and military competition. Despite intensive cooperation with Russia and China in several important spheres, Tajikistan, very much like Uzbekistan, will try not to side with China, and will abstain from joining Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).

Chinese interests in Tajikistan stem from the latter’s geographic position. The country borders on the unstable Afghanistan and shares a common frontier with Uzbekistan, the centerpiece of Beijing’s Central Asian strategy. In light of the perennial threat of instability potentially spilling over from Afghanistan to the Central Asian region, Beijing’s policy has been to support Tajikistan in upholding Tajikistan’s military and security forces.

Another reason for Chinese interests in and around Tajikistan has been the separatist movement in Xinjiang, western China. Indeed, Beijing has reasons to be concerned, as Xinjiang remains a problem and Central Asian fighters are returning home from the Middle East. There were already signs of deeper problems when in August 2016, a Uighur national ran a car into the Chinese embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, before it exploded, leaving several people injured.

Instances like this could drive Beijing into assuming a bigger military posture in Central Asia. There were reports from 2016 that the Chinese were building up to 10 defense infrastructure constructions on the Tajik-Afghan border. Beijing also recently increased its security cooperation with Tajik forces through joint border control exercises and even held their first joint military trainings with the bulk of the Tajik army.

China has already become Tajikistan’s top trade partner and the investment source. Tajikistan also features on China’s list of top transit countries in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). True that Kazakhstan, Russia, and Uzbekistan routes remain top locations for Chinese investments in infrastructure projects. But Tajikistan is slowly becoming more important as one of the BRI theories purports that the project is also about bringing internal stability to China’s relatively unstable neighbors.

Chinese politicians are clever enough not to position themselves as opposing Russian influence in Tajikistan. Indeed, an overview of Chinese analytical reports on the BRI or statements by Chinese officials show that Beijing is more concerned with other powers such as Japan, India or the US which could challenge the project in the Central Asia and elsewhere. In comparison, the Chinese are less inclined to think of Russian opposition to the BRI in Central Asia and Tajikistan in particular.

Russian Interests Under Strain

So far, Moscow too has not expressed any worries over Chinese growing activities in the region and Putin himself endorsed the BRI in his statements. Despite losing its primary economic position in Central Asia, Russia still retains a comfortable military position as it is the only foreign power which has military bases in the region and in Tajikistan in particular. Moreover, beyond the existing bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, Russia even aims to increase its presence in the region. For instance, it was reported in June that the Kyrgyz president reportedly asked Vladimir Putin to open a second Russian military base in Kyrgyzstan. Similar rumors have been spreading about Russian plans in Tajikistan too.

To solidify its position in the region, and Tajikistan in particular, Russia has also been very active in holding CSTO-led exercises as well as separate security and military initiatives with Dushanbe and other Central Asian countries. This is well reflected in Moscow’s significant progress in relations with largely unaligned Uzbekistan. Although Russian officials have often hinted at discussions with the Tajik government on the latter’s accession to the Eurasian Economic Union, Dushanbe will abstain from joining the project as long as possible.

Beyond projecting its influence through military moves, Moscow has also used its pet project the Eurasian Economic Union. The creation of the Union reflects this Russian geopolitical imperative, through which any western economic or military encroachment on the former Soviet space would be if not forestalled, then considerably constrained. Indeed, the creation of the Union (despite the fact that economics plays a big part in it) is also about further enabling Russia to project/solidify its influence over Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. Beyond trade, the countries also discuss security, military affairs and other vital spheres of cooperation. The overall idea, however, if not openly stated, has been to place the Eurasian Economic Union on the one hand as a balancer to the European Union and its enlargement in east Europe and on the other as an equal partner to China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

However here, too, Russia’s strategy has not given tangible results. Occasionally, media reports claim that Dushanbe talks about their potential involvement in the Union, but so far the expectations have fallen far short of real action. The reason is the same: Russia’s economic and military dominance within the Union is overbearing. But there could be another calculus, that Chinese involvement can potentially limit the need to entirely depend on Moscow. Moreover, Tajik officials also look at Kyrgyzstan, whose economy did not fare well following its entrance in the Union.

Overall, even though China frames its BRI and the ensuing economic projects in Uzbekistan not as a competition with Russia or other regional powers, but simply as a possibility to better reconnect the Central Asian region, still some geopolitical questions remain. How long will Moscow react as its economic clout recedes? Bearing in mind the economic potential of BRI, the fundamental weaknesses of the Eurasian Economic Union, what will Tashkent choose to pursue bigger economic growth.

In all likelihood, Tajikistan will remain a testing ground for Russia-China cooperation/competition in Central Asia. While Dushanbe will continue abstaining from joining the Eurasian Economic Union, Chinese economic clout and cooperation in security and military spheres will grow.

Emil Avdaliani