Bilateral Arrangements: A Transitional Stage to Heighten Georgia's Security?

Op-Ed

Whilst the security architecture of the Cold War largely remains in place, some noticeable changes are undermining its ostensibly formidable character, and these should not be overlooked. This trend is of paramount importance, and Tbilisi must keep a close watch on events in order to avoid being sidelined or ‘lost in translation’ when designing a national security agenda and communicating the latter to Georgia’s strategic partners.

Among the developments that need to be carefully monitored are a number of bilateral defense agreements of various shape and size which may complement and underpin the Alliance's collective defense system. These notably include attempts to further boost the US pivot to East Asia by outlining new prospects for partnership with Japan and increasing military co-operation with South Korea; but whilst creating an effective counterbalance to the North Korean threat by may be a leading factor of this new configuration, creating new regional security alliances capable of deterring China’s revisionist policies calls for a long-term strategy.

In addition to the numerous geographical factors influencing efforts to redesign both global and sub-regional security models, several other equally challenging processes both within NATO and between its members are adding to Georgia’s headaches. Readers will no doubt already be quite familiar with the various centrifugal movements calling for more national sovereignty in various NATO (and EU) member states, which therefore need not be discussed here. More alarming, however, are the issues that are gradually driving wedges between the Alliance’s 29 members, and that have led to a growing number of regional clubs and intergovernmental agreements. Some relatively recent examples of this include Macron's France seeking greater rapprochement with Trump's administration; America’s growing defensive stance in Poland and Warsaw’s willingness to become a new ‘center of gravity’ for efforts to counter Russian revisionist pressure between the Baltic and the Black Sea; and the de facto operations of the ‘Northern Group’, an alliance of 12 northern European nations keen to reinforce their regional security and defense. And as if that was not enough, NATO’s western and eastern halves continue to argue over the desirability of further eastwards expansion to new states sharing borders with Russia.

But all this is just the tip of iceberg when considering the question of Georgia progressing from ad hoc, project-based forms of co-operation with the Alliance to more systematic ones. Although the author has been arguing for some time that Tbilisi deserves to be granted a ‘short cut’ to NATO integration, and that the country could be waved through the Alliance’s often overly orthodox (and occasionally obsolete) membership criteria (q.v. ‘Georgia's Foreign-Policy "Great Game": a Multifaceted Coin’ or ‘Georgia's NATO Membership: A Definitive Decision Has (Yet) to Come’, both published in GEORGIA TODAY), we should all be aware of current contradictions and discord, and recognize the fact that bilateral security arrangements can complement the country’s chosen strategy of NATO integration.

Some (helpful) parallels

At first glance, the case of Israel seems rather obvious. The 2012 US-Israel Enhanced Security Co-operation Act, after referring to the ‘special bond’ which links the two nations, deepens security and defense ties through a variety of actions including the expansion of ‘joint military exercises’, the provision of ‘defense articles and defense services’, the expansion of ‘already-close intelligence co-operation’, etc. More importantly, and particularly considering the fact that Israel is not a member of NATO, the Act also calls for ‘an expanded role for Israel within [the Alliance], including an enhanced presence at NATO headquarters and exercises’. In addition, the agreement recommends that additional surplus United States Department of Defense items and services be transferred to Israel under certain conditions. Yet although the 2012 US-Israel Act does provide some helpful tips and guidelines, and therefore may at first seem to be a good example, it is not really relevant to Georgia (contrary to widespread public belief). Beyond the ‘special bond’, the Act rests upon Israel’s contributions to military innovation (which have saved the lives of American soldiers and have yielded advanced military technologies), its first-hand experience of modern combat, and the value of the satellite imagery and other intelligence it can share.

An example which is perhaps closer to the Georgian scenario of seeking to ‘upgrade’ the country’s status to that of a strategic defense partner is the San Francisco System. Named after the city in which the United States and Japan signed two treaties in 1951 setting out the terms according to which Japan’s independence would be restored, it grew to become known as the ‘hub and spokes’ system. In essence, the United States were the hub, and the spokes were a number of bilateral defense treaties with various Far Eastern countries, notably Taiwan, South Korea and Japan. The case of Taiwan, by the way, is unique, since the US do not entertain diplomatic relations with the island. Instead, a Taiwan Relations Act states that in case of ‘any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people of Taiwan’ and ‘any danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom’, the American President and Congress shall ‘determine the appropriate action in response to any such danger’ (not to mention sales of advanced military equipment). Yet whilst the Taiwanese example is relatively vague in terms of defining a legal obligation to defend, the US-Japan Security Treaty explicitly states that ‘each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety’. In turn, America’s mutual defense treaties with South Korea and the Philippines use almost identical language (with some caveats for disputed territories claimed by the latter), and are also considered as pillars of America’s strategic rebalancing in Asia.

Overall, the key factor which unites this network of asymmetric alliances is a ‘common danger’ which does not necessarily trigger an armed response, and each alliance is predominantly premised upon a political agreement rather than a strict legal obligation. That said, these agreements undeniably serve as a solid deterrent to any aggressive assertions of revisionist powers.

What this all means for Georgia

Military considerations are the key ingredient of any asymmetric bilateral treaty alliance, but they are by no means the only one. Georgia is in many ways the West’s key partner in the region, but its status needs to be upgraded to it formally becoming a major defense partner. The co-operation framework should go beyond the supply of defense articles, and should instead focus heavily upon issues of organization structure, planning and personnel. Having been granted a ‘Substantial Package’ by NATO, Georgia is already half-way to a higher level of partnership (and therefore status). Putting aside any shyness or hesitation, the synergy has to be full and unreserved, and history remembers quite a few successful attempts to reform foreign armed forces (the American program to transform Greece’s military after World War II being a particularly good example). But one must also remember that in Georgia’s case, the story is not merely about weapons.

Tbilisi’s loftier goal is to ensure a solid and reliable system for the country’s defense, particularly as Georgia surpassed all its neighbours long ago in terms of democracy building, accountability, governance, the sustainability of public services, etc. The country is also a reference among a number of Eastern European nations in terms of transparency, and efforts to support its welfare and encourage further success would obviously send a powerful signal to other, perhaps less exemplary, countries.

Making any choice clearly requires a careful calculation of pros and cons. Bilateral agreements, on the other hand, which involve two states enjoying different levels of status and power, are about achieving a balance. Consequently, they can be likened to a contract whereby a major power guarantees and supports a smaller country’s security in case of military conflict and, in return, influences its foreign policy. For Georgia, however, this latter disadvantage will always largely be watered down by the strong alignment of its foreign policy agenda with those of its partners. And besides, the country needs a real and effective response to mitigate the subversion and military threats which seek to punish Tbilisi for its unwavering commitment to the free world (unique in the region, alas). ‘Thinking fast’ but not ‘thinking slowly’, with creativity and boldness present, is the pre-requisite for both Georgia and the free world goal of making this country safer while simultaneously improving Western agendas.

Victor Kipiani