Trump's Foreign Policy Puzzle with Hindsight

If you hate a person, you hate something in him that is part of yourself.

What isn't part of ourselves, doesn't disturb us.

Herman Hesse

Over a year has passed since the last US presidential elections, marking a rather convenient milestone (albeit merely thanks to hindsight) for a definitive analysis of the Trump administration’s foreign policy. Indeed, a proper understanding of the new charts (if any) according to which the country is being steered on the global map can help us to trace future developments in 2018 and beyond. Beyond the academic interest in doing so, acquiring such an understanding is especially important for Georgia given the need to recalibrate and readjust, whenever needed, the country’s foreign policy to world affairs.

Our reading of US foreign policy-making is based upon a series of categories which are briefly outlined below.

Nothing Has Changed At All

Among the key prevailing thoughts when attempting to interpret current US foreign policy, the legacy of retrenchment and the abandonment of the world’s "peripheries" have gained fresh momentum—albeit only under the veil of a new disguise.

For centuries, the key drivers of US foreign policy have been propagating the new Wilsonian vision of an expanded Monroe Doctrine, and marking US national interests around the globe wherever the need to consolidate and defend the liberal order was at stake. This policy was not only carried out by interposing post-World War II arrangements (e.g. the UN, Bretton Woods institutions, etc.), but also by nestling new democracies under a unified (read: predominantly American) security umbrella. This order in fact led to a Pax Americana, and was heavily fed by Cold War realities and existential threats to liberal international values.

The Wilsonian vision survived the break-up of the Soviet bloc, and both the George W. Bush and later Clinton administrations largely continued to successfully pursue a new, somewhat modified version of "perpetuating the liberal order". Efforts to consistently maintain this doctrine following the Cold War first faltered due to overstretched capabilities after 9/11, and culminated in Russia's invasion of Georgia in 2008. All in all, facing a set of worldwide challenges, Obama opted for a policy of withdrawing from peripheral responsibilities (seen from the standpoint of US core interests) by reconciling, in a way, American commitments with corresponding capabilities.

Various observers argue that Trump's policies are not U-turns, but rather a tweaking of Obama's trend towards retrenchment and a fine-tuning of "selective" diplomacy.

A Policy Of Incoherence

Much has been said about the apparent lack of a Grand Strategy for current US foreign policy, but during this very initial stage of the Trump era one of the prevailing views is that the US is strongly biased towards a visible record of flip-flopping on key geopolitical and geo-economic issues. This approach is nothing new, however, and was purportedly the basis for the maverick dealings of Nixon’s national security adviser, Henry Kissinger. Called the "madman theory", the core goal is to express a "rational irrationality" as part of a well-calculated strategy of achieving concessions from adversaries and partners by appearing unsophisticated and immature. According to other analyses, the strategy rests upon a level of gambling on irresponsibility in international affairs which practically verges on intimidation (when needed) and a coercive "diplomacy behind the curtains". Moreover, some argue that it is imperative for the United States, as a liberal hegemon, to maintain a degree of flexibility and the ability to sail with the wind, and that the country would be much better off without the rigidity imposed by outlining its preferences and assessing underlying costs and benefits.

By doing so, the country's leadership would restrict its capacity for choice—especially given the turbulence and unpredictability of international politics.

This approach has multiple intrinsically negative effects, however: any discrepancy between the President’s credibility and the country’s own credibility damages US interests; foreign leaders are forced to gauge real intentions by turning to the "grown-ups" in the administration; the President loses his authority on the international stage; and, ultimately, the United States risks losing predictability along with credibility.

"Uniquely" Trumpish Policy Traits

The world order, post 1945, emerged through a set of international institutions, with the United States ensuring the liberal order and freedom by either entering into open-ended alliances or deploying troops abroad. Despite having shrunk in size and impact following the end of the Cold War, this policy was never called into question—at least not openly—until recently, when President-elect Trump boldly ventured into discussions of US international commitments, significantly outweighing the benefits of "nation-building at home" (note the strong resemblance with the so-called Jacksonian populist nationalism), and encouraging interaction on various important international issues on a transactional, case-by-case basis.

We touched upon the transactional nature of US foreign policy in earlier publications, stating that this transactionality could be seen as part of a new version of realpolitik. At that time, however, we were of the opinion that this novel approach was due to the abandonment of bipolar and multi-polar worlds, ensuring a focused pragmatism during tactical decision-making but maintaining the imperative of long-term consistency. Today, this statement remains valid if one considers that the tactical essence of a state-led corporate process is maintained, and that the administration strongly favors direct engagement with other state actors with a firm (and unashamed) emphasis on trade-offs, utilizing the plethora of means at its disposal whenever necessary and on a case-by-case basis. Developments in South-east Asia are a clear example of this, and yet this policy is not without its flaws and is visibly in disarray when dealing with crises in the Middle East.

So Where Do We Stand?

States, like investors with their portfolios, can manage risk by diversifying their foreign policies. This diversification is even more appealing to small nations, especially those at the crossroads of major geopolitical policies.

In fact, the search for order at home and abroad is an arduous exercise which demands sustainability, cohesion, and a set of flexible actions ready to be deployed. The latter may well consist of piecemeal responses but, ultimately, should not deviate from a strategic course of coherence. Even more critical and exhausting is the need to reconcile both larger interests with limited risks as well as patience with pragmatism, paying due attention to both one’s means and ideals.

As for Georgia in a decentralizing world, transactionality may well be an option, particularly given the fact that a major ally is arguably shying away from showing clear-cut "leadership" in the region. But such an approach requires an amazing set of skills capable of handling the process in a highly sophisticated manner, as nations that hedge their bets on conflicting big interests can become trapped, and doing so during the unpredictable redistribution of powers and influence is even more precarious. Another problem in this regard is the risk of diving into huge uncertainty with highly destructive consequences. It is also worthwhile to bear in mind the deplorable history of humankind, during which the interests of small states have very often been sacrificed in order to please larger ones; nothing guarantees that the former will be taken into consideration when the latter are dealing or “transacting” with each other under the pretext of various bilateral or multilateral formats (i.e. "business as usual").

Although the real quest for a Georgian transactionality seems less urgent considering the unequivocal stance of the free world standing alongside us and all the support we receive from "the indispensable nation" (a term coined by Madeleine Albright), we should not forget that what we are observing is clearly a growing trend to economize in international relations which is largely prompted by a very real businessman at the helm of the largest economy in the world.

Regardless of the real face of international politics when it comes to Georgia's challenges, most of us agree (or ideally should) that the main task is to build a much more "grown-up" and "responsible" country—one which, in a changing world, predominantly relies on its own resources and capabilities and, in the first instance, is guided by its national interests.

Victor Kipiani