Russia-Iran Partnership: Economics, Politics & Regional Ambitions

Op-Ed

Throughout centuries, Iran has been a regional power. Powerful Iranian dynasties such as Achaemenids, Sasanians in the ancient period, or Safavids and Kajars in the XVII-XVIII cc. aspired to achieve a major role in the Middle East, South Caucasus and elsewhere. Autor the Cold War, decades followed with sanctions imposed by western countries on Tehran’s nuclear program, constraining Iran in its being able to project economic and political influence in the above regions.

However, with sanctions officially lifted in early 2016 and, despite rhetoric, the Trump administration not reversing the Iran nuclear deal for the moment, means Iran now sees avenues for projecting its economic and political clout in its neighborhood from the Mediterranean to the South Caucasus and elsewhere.

These geopolitical ambitions, however, do overlap with another large power: Russia. Moscow has its own imperatives in the South Caucasus, where its struggles to keep the EU and the US at bay, and in Syria where Europeans and Americans likewise have their own stakes.

Current cooperation between Russia and Iran ranges from economic and military to purely geopolitical reasons. For instance, both are aiming for the European market to initiate/increase their gas and oil exports to Europe. Indeed, Iran is quite well positioned to have its share of the European gas market as the EU is worried about Russian predominance there. Iranian gas could be a very good tool to assuage European fears, but to export its gas, Iran would need the Black Sea ports of Batumi and Poti in Georgia. Moreover, Tehran has often expressed its willingness to use the Trans-Anatolian Gas Pipeline and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline.

As a result, there has been progress made by the Iranian side to establish itself on the Black Sea coast. In late 2016, it was agreed that Iranians would construct oil-reproduction facilities near Georgia’s Black Sea city of Supsa on approximately 1.2 square kilometers.

However, despite some successes, there are significant constraints which Iran will continue facing in the South Caucasus, as Russia and Turkey are well represented both militarily and economically in the region. Russia, for instance, successfully obstructs any Iranian moves on establishing independent/new pipelines or railways to Armenia and Georgia.

Another area of involvement for Iran in the Russian “sphere of influence” could be the simmering Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In the early 1990s, there were some unsuccessful attempts by the Iranian government to mediate the conflict. Since both Armenia and Azerbaijan border on Iran, it is quite natural to expect Tehran to try to play a bigger role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, Russia, which still is a dominant power in the conflict resolution process, would be opposed to any Iranian initiatives which can diminish Moscow’s role.

Despite rivalry, Iran and Russia can also cooperate

Still, although from the geopolitical standpoint Russo-Iranian relations are not always devoid of difficulties, there is ground for cooperation between the two. The map of Eurasia gives a glimpse into the rationale of the Russian political elite behind closer cooperation with Iran. Russian political thinkers of the 1990s often thought that Iran and Turkey should have been pillars of future Russian influence in the Middle East. The so-called Eurasianists (those who believe that Russia is neither in Europe nor in Asia, but in order to successfully compete with western powers, it needs Teheran and Ankara) under Russian president Vladimir Putin saw their notions officially pushed aside, though not in practice. It has been in Russia’s perennial interests to keep Iran at least neutral, and it happened historically both during the Romanov period and the Soviet empire.

It is in both countries’ common interests to cooperate in obstructing western military encroachment in the South Caucasus and Middle East. Both consider the evolving US grand strategy in the Eurasian landmass as negative to their respective geopolitical imperatives. For Russia, the US violates the post-Cold War order by ramping up military pressure on Moscow in the former Soviet space; for Iran, the US wants to limit Tehran’s nuclear ambitions as well as Iranian geopolitical outreach throughout the Middle East. Indeed, this common fear of the United States could be considered one of the drivers behind close Russo-Iranian cooperation. Recently, when the US unveiled a new national strategy document enumerating major problems across Eurasia, Russia and Iran featured as most problematic for Washington.

One such theater of cooperation is in Syria, where both are interested in stopping western (primarily US) influence in the country. Much has been written on what military and economic measures Russia and Iran have been implementing in Syria for years already. But as usual, real differences between war-time allies began only after the end of hostilities. Indeed, from time to time there have been hints in media on various disagreements between Russia and Iran on methods, aims and results of the war in Syria. Indeed, although Moscow and Tehran cooperate, they also loath each other’s geopolitical ambitions. Iran has almost solidified its land reach to the Mediterranean, and Moscow could well be worried that a strong Iran would be less susceptible to follow the Russian lead.

It could be argued that despite the fact that Russia and Iran do share political differences in the Middle East as well as a number of energy issues, geopolitical forces right now are strong enough to drive the two to continue even closer cooperation in the future.

Emil Avdaliani