No Deal. Again
Op-Ed
Karasin and Abashidze have met for the first time since the Year of the Dog began. Before flying to Prague, both diplomats airing their respective accusations to the media. These mainly concerned the issue of monitoring cargo turnover on the Russian-Georgian border, and made it clear what the parties would be discussing in the Hotel Diplomat of Prague.
According to the agreement signed in 2011, Russia and Georgia took responsibility for seeking out a neutral party which would control cargo turnover at the borders. Official Tbilisi has already signed the agreement with a Swiss company, and now it’s Russia’s turn. But, as usual, one and the same documents are interpreted differently in Georgia and Russia, and often become the reason for reciprocal accusations and delays.
Moscow argues that the agreement about customs monitoring concerns the borders between Abkhazia and Tskhinvali regions, while Official Tbilisi states that there is no mention of the borders at all, especially those of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali. The agreement speaks only of trading corridors and the neutral party, in this case the Swiss observers who will control the start and end points of the borders. “This agreement is between Georgia and Russia; and the regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali, no other regions of Georgia are mentioned,” Abashidze said.
Different interpretations of a single document seem quite unbelievable, but explaining why Official Moscow is so stubborn about signing the document is not difficult, especially for such an experienced diplomat as Abashidze. The agreement signed in 2011 wasn’t exactly to the taste of the Abkhazian and Ossetian separatists, since there was no mention of them in the document at all; plus, they weren’t involved at all in the preparatory works or the actual signing.
Notably, specific locations were defined solely using geographical coordinates, latitude and longitude, which made Moscow face a really tough dilemma: Russia recognized the so-called independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but by signing an agreement of such importance, where the interests and even the existence of these two so-called independent republics was completely neglected, it would be interpreted as a public undermining of this very recognition. On the other hand, if Russia had insisted on specifically mentioning these “independent states” in the agreement, Georgia would naturally refuse to sign it.
Thus, the agreement of 2011 was the result of difficult diplomatic compromises. The following algorithm was written down on paper, but not executed in reality: Three trade corridors would be created between Russia and Georgia: Sochi-Zugdidi, Vladikavkaz-Gori and Vladikavkaz-Kazbegi. This last was just a formality, designed mainly to “keep the right image” for Russia. Neutral observers or inventories would be allocated at the start and end of each of the separatist regions, among them in Gori and Zugdidi, there to physically control the passing cargo on the territory of the separatist regions using GPS technologies. And it is this last clause that drives the separatists especially crazy.
Russia is now actively creating ambiguous customs alliances with the occupied Sokhumi and Tskhinvali, thus trying to somehow turn the active regimes of occupied territories into existing “subjects” within the agreement of 2011. An example of this is how a customs office recently opened in Akhalgori: Ossetian from the outside, but Russian on the inside, as well as those control checkpoints at Enguri. We can already predict that the same fate awaits the 2011 agreement as all those numerous documents that have been signed between Tbilisi and Russia so far. Or as they like to say here, “this deal has no future.”
Zaza Jgarkava