Russian Policy in the South Caucasus: Nexus of Appeasement & Coercion

The South Caucasus, as a part of the post-soviet space, is included in Russia’s self-declared zone of special interests. Russia has always faced challenges to perceive the newly independent post-soviet republics, with the exception of the Baltic States, as truly sovereign states. This was especially the case regarding their right to implement independent foreign and security policy. That is why Moscow becomes agitated by even the discussions of former soviet republics’ possible membership in the EU or NATO. A growing discontent with the post-Cold War era, international order and alleged Western attempts to weaken Russia’s positions in its immediate neighborhood have resulted in Moscow’s persistent efforts to institutionalize its influence within the post-soviet space. The establishment of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Customs Union and later the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) are key steps within the well-articulated Russian strategy towards that goal. The Ukraine crisis and followed strategic rift with the Euro-Atlantic community have deepened the Russian perception of it being a fortress under the siege. In this context, the role of the post-soviet space as a buffer against the Western encroachment into Russia proper becomes vital in securing Russian long-term strategic interests. Given the results of the March 18 presidential elections, at least in the coming six years, Russia will double down efforts to strengthen its role and influence within the perimeter of its immediate neighborhood. Given the growing calls within the US, NATO and EU elites of the necessity to implement a policy of containment against Russia, the post-soviet space has all chances of becoming the hot spot for a Russia-West competition.

In this context, the South Caucasus represents an interesting case. Armenia is fully anchored within the Russian sphere of influence and is a member of both the CSTO and EAEU. However, Yerevan seeks to maintain partner relations with Euro-Atlantic community, perceiving it as a source for the financial and technical assistance needed to modernize the state. Georgia is pursuing a policy of Euro-Atlantic integration and, since the 2008 war and recognition of Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence by Russia, there are few chances for improvements in bilateral relations. Meanwhile, Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic integration has probably reached its limits by the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU. Few believe in Georgia’s membership of EU or NATO in the foreseeable future. Simultaneously, after the 2012 “change of command” in Georgia, Tbilisi and Moscow have implemented some steps to improve economic relations. Azerbaijan, relying on its oil and gas resources, is seeking to keep a balance between Russia and the West. Baku has rejected the EU offer to sign an Association Agreement and yet is not in a rush to enter either the CSTO or EAEU.

One consistent feature of the Russian policy in the South Caucasus is the efficient combination of appeasement and coercion. In the case of Armenia, Russia effectively uses the CSTO mechanisms to supply Russian weapons to Armenia at a reduced price. The Russian military base deployed in Gyumri serves as a tool of containment against possible Turkish direct military involvement in the Karabakh conflict. The hundreds of thousand Armenian migrants currently work in Russia and their remittances play a key role in fostering the Armenian economy. Simultaneously, Moscow does not shy away from putting pressure on Armenia using the Karabakh conflict if Armenia looks to be drifting closer to the West. The 2013 Armenian decision to join the Customs Union and later Eurasian Economic Union after finalizing negotiations on the Association Agreement with the EU is a stark example of that policy.

In its relations with Georgia, Moscow seeks to foster economic relations and deepen Russian involvement in the Georgian economy as a way to get leverage on Georgia. The decision to open Russian markets for Georgian wine and other agricultural products is a step within that strategy. The expert level discussions on the possibility of creating in Georgia some form of confederation which will allow the return of Abkhazia and South Ossetia if Georgia joins the Eurasian Economic Union is another move within that appeasement strategy. The recent NDI poll results, according to which some 30% of the Georgian population wants to see Georgia entering the EAEU, is proof that the Russian policy has some impact. Simultaneously, Russia was actively using the policy of expansion of the South Ossetia territory by moving boundary fences deeper into Georgia as a tool of coercion and an attempt to negatively influence the Georgian policy of Euro-Atlantic integration. The Russian message to Georgia was clear: ‘Your partners and allies in the West have zero influence on the ground and can’t protect you from further territorial losses. Meanwhile, you may choose to be a friend of Russia and in that case at least there are chances to solve your most pressing security issues.’

Russia is playing the same game with Azerbaijan. Moscow has provided multi-billion dollars modern assault weaponry to Baku, raising hopes in Azerbaijan of reaching a substantial shift in the balance of power with Armenia and thus gaining the upper hand in negotiations. Russia is also actively promoting economic cooperation with Azerbaijan both in bilateral and multilateral formats. Russia – Iran – Azerbaijan trilateral summits held in August 2016 in Baku and in November 2017 in Tehran have fostered Azerbaijan’s transit role as a key player in North – South transport corridor which will link India with Europe, passing through Iran, Azerbaijan and Russia.

Simultaneously, Russia seeks to exploit the Karabakh conflict as leverage against Azerbaijan, attempting to influence its foreign and security policy, including discussions on possible Azerbaijani membership in the EAEU. Russia sometimes uses Moscow-based Azerbaijani billionaires as a tool to put covert pressure on Azerbaijani leadership, hinting at possible active involvement in Azerbaijani domestic policy.

Thus, in the upcoming six years, the key feature of Russian policy in the South Caucasus would be consistent efforts to further institutionalize its influence. Russia will seek to maintain the status quo in Russia-Armenia relations while simultaneously trying to pull both Azerbaijan and Georgia closer to the EAEU. Another key task for Russia would be to reduce the Western influence in the region. In this context, the emerging Russia – Turkey – Iran alliance may well support the implementation of Moscow’s grand design.

Dr. Benyamin Poghosyan is the Executive Director of the Political Science Association of Armenia. @benyamin_poghos

Benyamin Poghosyan