GRASS On Georgia’s Vulnerabilities to Russian Influence
On April 17, the Georgia Reform Associates (GRASS) presented their report on Georgia within the framework of Romanian think-tank Global Focus’ year-long study, “Propaganda Made-to-Measure: How Our Vulnerabilities Facilitate Russian Influence.” The study assesses the permeability of countries in the Black Sea region to malign influence, and propaganda and the associated Propaganda Permeability Index provides the in-depth, extensive analysis of what makes us vulnerable to hostile influences, with a focus on the Kremlin agenda.
The report on Georgia focused on four key areas: society; economy; politics; foreign policy and security. The authors of each area were: Mariam Tsitsikashvili and Davit Kutidze; Beso Namchavadze; Paata Gaprindashvili; Gogi Zoidze and Giorgi Goguadze.
In his opening remarks, GRASS Director Paata Gaprindashvili stressed the need for Georgia, its government and civil society, to regularly analyze the risks and dangers posed by Russia.“We must understand that anti-Western propaganda in the hands of Russia is the weapon through which it capitalizes on the weaknesses existing in different fields. First of all, we need to analyze these weaknesses so that Russia cannot achieve its long-term goals, which means Georgia’s going back under Russian influence so as to hamper its integration into NATO and the EU.”
Mariam Tsitsikashvili, host of the presentation, explained the framework of the study. “We have taken an early warning approach and hence have focused our research to see what is it that we, in our societies, do wrong/not do enough of and which of our weaknesses can help our enemies. We were looking at what Russia can use of what we do, more than at what Russia does. The goal is simple: to discuss our weaknesses that might well fall in the hands of Moscow or any other illiberal state wishing to meddle in our societies.”
She added that, “Russian propaganda and malign influence use internal (structural) vulnerabilities and seek to amplify existing fractures to reach a tipping point. The ultimate goals are, firstly, to prevent governments and societies from making policy choices that help them become increasingly autonomous, efficient, successful and integrated with the West while the Kremlin’s aim is to reverse the course of such developments, drawing them as close as possible into Moscow’s sphere of influence and control, and to shape their identities to converge with the Russian worldview and posture, thus turning them into long-time partners/ proxies/ satellites or even ‘army of zombies’.
The focus was made on vulnerabilities/potentialities that have already been exploited by the Kremlin and more importantly those which “might get exploited at any later stage.”
In the societal sphere, the Kremlin has been making use of various channels and actors, like media, politicians, public figures and the clergy, in an attempt “to erode public faith in democratic institutions, spread illiberal propaganda, undermine pro-Western sentiments in Georgian society by portraying the West as an enemy to Georgia’s identity and Russia as an indispensable “brother” with a common history and a common faith, preserve adherence to Russia's imperial aura, prevent Georgia from modernizing in order to become a member of the EU and NATO and hinder Georgia’s democratic development overall,” Tsitsikashvili explained.
She added that Georgian society’s nostalgia towards the Soviet Union, with some 42% of respondents of the opinion that the dissolution of the USSR was bad for Georgia and 57% believing that Stalin played a very/mostly positive role in history, are the “sorts of sentiments which anti-Western disseminators make ample use of to further ignite sympathy for the Soviet past. Nostalgia for the Soviet period is exacerbated by an understanding of history infused by propaganda.”
The rising of radicalism and nationalistic sentiments is another societal aspect exploited by pro-Kremlin forces “From social attitudes to legislative proposals, much is formulated in terms of identity and identity conflict… The diversity of Georgian society is instrumentalized as a “dangerous fragmentation” by radical nationalist groups, some of whom are openly pro-Russians… Intolerance is part of Georgian society towards ethnic, religious, and /or LGBTQ minorities… All these sentiments are sophisticatedly exploited by radical groups, or the Kremlin itself, who portray liberal values, tolerance and peaceful coexistence with minorities as leading to the loss of Georgian identity.”
The incumbent regime’s willingness to ride the populist wave is another concern that was expressed at the presentation. “What we have underlined as more alarming is not the number of those radical groups, but the fact the administration has been tacitly supportive of these undercurrents by their passive if not encouraging attitudes, climbing on the populist wave, which also explains their proliferation, as they are not marginalized or penalized in any way either by society or by the state, and in some way, they are endorsed by the Church, which enjoys more trust than state institutions.”
Indeed, another societal risk that has been identified is the fact that democracy isn’t acknowledged as ‘the only game in town’ in Georgia. “Georgian society still finds religious institutions to be more trustworthy than democratic institutions. Public opinion polls reveal that trust in the Church has been consistently high, whilst trust in parliament, the government and the judiciary has been much lower and fluctuating. The high level of trust in the Georgian Church may become a vulnerability, since the institution itself or some of its clergy often spread anti-Western and/or xenophobic narratives and often intervene in public policy-making on issues of non-discrimination and minority rights in ways which coincide with Russian interests,” Tsitsikashvili explained.
However, the Church isn’t the only actor to use anti-Western rhetoric. Media, especially of the online format, along with pro-Russian NGOs, also aid the dissemination of Russian propaganda in society. “In this context, lack of western language knowledge, ICT skills and media literacy are the vulnerabilities that ample societal susceptibility towards the Kremlin-spread disinformation campaigns,” Tsitsikashvili said.
In the economic sphere, the risks are also significant. In sum, “There is a high risk that Russia will make a political decision to ban the import of Georgian products, limit travel for Russian tourists and make it difficult for labor migrants to transfer money to Georgia, or even force them to leave Russia altogether. In this case, significant material losses (USD 1.2 billion or 9% of Georgia’s GDP) will be inflicted,” the presentation explained.
The domestic political environment plays a central role in determining whether or not Moscow will be effective in its subversive efforts or not. As Tsitsikashvili explained, to that end “the Georgian state of governance, politics and rule of law still offers plenty of cracks for Russia to penetrate the system.
“Our analysis identifies particular shortfalls in Georgian politics, including: weak institutions, starting from informal and deinstitutionalized governance, lack of parliamentary oversight over the government, lack of civic control over security services and law enforcement structures, deficiencies in the system of democratic checks and balances, shortfalls in the justice sector expressed in the political control over the judiciary, overall weakness of political parties that has its consequences in voter apathy, low party funding that creates a loophole for the Russian interference, a fragmented pro-Western opposition and the rise of pro-Russian, or in other words ethno-nationalistic parties, plausible infiltration of security and political institutions, weak checks and balance, party politics dominated by personalities rather than ideologies, and lack of bipartisanship among the political parties.”
With regards to foreign policy and security, Russia’s primary goal is to keep Georgia within its sphere of influence, hinder its political, economic and security autonomy and prevent Tbilisi’s integration with the West. The most obvious path to achieve this has been the occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the Russian military presence there, followed by borderization and potential annexation. “Russia is intentionally protracting the ‘borderization’ process to keep the pressure on the Georgian government and the international community and create a sense of indefensibility and vulnerability. … This, among others, serves one of Russia’s key objectives of ‘keeping Georgia from joining NATO and the EU, by portraying Georgia to the members of those organizations as unstable and militarily indefensible and, therefore, a potential liability as a member,’” the presentation explained.
The incumbent government’s responses to the threats were also discussed. “In a limited way, the government has acknowledged Russian propaganda as a threat in its strategic documents, As the study was concluded last year, the recent updates are not available within it. However, we welcome positive developments in this regard. The Foreign Affairs Committee of Parliament is working on its strategy and it will be finalized within the following weeks. And the good news is that the Committee quite explicitly acknowledges the emerging threats stemming from the Kremlin-waged hybrid war and, most importantly, the Committee takes upon itself a responsibility to develop the relevant legislative basis for preventing and countering hybrid threats, including disinformation. We’ve also seen one of the political parties announce that they are developing a package of legislative initiatives for countering Russian propaganda in Georgia. Better late than never, as they say, and we should welcome these initiatives and hope that it will become a matter of bipartisan cooperation,” Tsitsikashvili said.
However, while the government is indeed working on combatting the threat, there are still significant warnings to be heeded, “Developing a legislation for countering Russian Propaganda and information warfare is not enough. And what we have identified as one of the biggest vulnerabilities of Georgia’s security and foreign policy is the lack of a holistic and comprehensive National Security Strategy, which should be the framework to form, plan and better implement the country’s security policy. The most recent document which attempted an overview of the foreign and security policy environment is the National Security Concept of 2011. The concept has not been updated since then and was not accompanied by any action plan or mechanisms for implementing the goals set out in the document. Unfortunately, the National Security Review that would streamline the roles and responsibilities of relevant state agencies and lead to the development of a package of conceptual and strategic documents has yet to be conducted. The absence of the key strategic document and of human capacity simultaneously increases the level of vulnerability and fragility in front of the threats facing Georgia. The lack of an overall strategic vision means that the state apparatus is destined to be bogged down in its routine activities and limited in any long-term development perspectives.”
By Máté Földi