Russia Sends a Rare Signal to China in Tajikistan
On July 17, the Russian defense ministry announced that approximately 10,000 Tajik troops, alongside soldiers from the Russian 201st military base (located in Tajikistan), would participate in a four-day exercise which began that day. Russian-Tajik exercises are not unusual, usually held near the Tajik-Afghan border or in central parts of Tajikistan.
The July 17 exercises, however, were surprisingly held in Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO). GBAO has historically been a “mutinous” region, which played a pivotal role in Tajikistan’s civil war of the early 1990s. Russia’s decision to hold exercises in this region is interesting in the light of recent reports of China increasing its activities in GBAO, with the country having reportedly built military facilities on the Tajik-Afghan border.
Chinese security-related moves in Tajikistan form what is generally seen as a part of the Russo-Chinese competition for economic and political influence in Central Asia. Despite intensive cooperation with Russia and China in several important spheres, Tajikistan, very much like Uzbekistan, tries not to side with China, and abstains from joining the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).
Chinese interests in Tajikistan stem from the latter’s geographic position. The country borders on unstable Afghanistan and shares a common frontier with Uzbekistan, the centerpiece of Beijing’s Central Asian strategy. In light of the perennial threat of instability potentially spilling over from Afghanistan to the Central Asian region, Beijing’s policy has been to support Tajikistan in upholding Tajikistan’s military and security forces.
Another reason for Chinese interests in and around Tajikistan has been the separatist movement in Xinjiang, western China. Indeed, Beijing has reasons to be concerned, as Xinjiang remains a problem as Central Asian fighters are returning home from the Middle East. There were already signs of deeper problems. For example, in August 2016, a Uighur national ran a car into the Chinese embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, before it exploded, leaving several people injured.
Trade between the five Central Asian states and China grew to $30 billion in 2016, compared with $18.6 billion between the region and Russia. From this perspective, with the decision to hold the recent exercises in GBAO, Russia might have sent a subtle signal to China about the latter’s growing interests in Tajikistan.
On the surface though, Russia has been quite positive about China’s ambitious, multi-billion “One Belt, One Road” project. Although, quite naturally, China’s growing economic influence would put Russia under pressure, Russian politicians have generally avoided to comment negatively on the Chinese influence in Central Asia. Moscow’s strained relations with Europe in recent years have encouraged the Kremlin look eastward for investments, additional markets for its gas and oil and general political support in the international arena.
Moscow would prefer to avoid undermining its close contacts with Beijing, but nevertheless will also make some moves whereby its dominant military position in Central Asia is further strengthened. Russia has a military base in Tajikistan. In Kyrgyzstan, there have been some reports that Moscow plans to open a second military base.
A Global Perspective
From a more global perspective, the Russians see that the current US-China trade disagreements in fact represent a first grave sign of coming disagreements between these two economic powerhouses. Chinese and American geopolitical imperatives clash, and trade is one of them. In the long term, this competition might evolve into a battle for Eurasia. Russia’s position will be crucial, and the Russians understand this. They also understand that Russia might be at the center of a geopolitical bargaining in which Beijing and Washington both try to entice Moscow.
In this grand strategic view, it is still early to mark Russia as a second-rank power. Russia is definitely weaker than the US and China, but Russia could nevertheless achieve many concessions if Washington and Beijing clash (not necessarily directly militarily). It is also true that Europe is scoring some significant points in parts of Eurasia where Russia has been dominant for centuries. Nevertheless, the US and China could give up on some of their interests in favor of Moscow in order to get Russia on their side.
World geopolitics is currently evolving around the current US-China competition over Eurasia, and Russia can gain much in the post-Soviet space if it sides with one of them.
By Emil Avdaliani