Discourse (Not Only) on the Region. Part I

Analysis

Our world is so dynamic that every week that passes seems to leave so much new material for discussion and analysis that we practically need to rank it before being able to choose the most interesting.

I have mentioned several times in my previous papers that the world has begun to follow a path whose guidelines and orientations we can largely only assume. The same could be said of the complex South Caucasus region, which is at the intersection of opposing interests.

As a result, all our attempts to evaluate certain events and to forecast how they will evolve, even in the medium term, require both close observation and extreme caution. Quite understandably, I will begin this conversation with our region and indeed in our immediate neighborhood, where a new and developing phase of confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan is directly linked to Georgia’s internal stability and external sustainability.

More on the Recent Flare

When speaking about recent developments, it is clear that any possible escalation of military actions in the Caucasus poses an open threat to regional security, as well as to Georgia’s essential regional and international interests. That this surely relates to the renewed confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan which began on July 12 has become a subject of active discussion and assessment. Yet it seems that this phase of the conflict is somehow different from previous ones, and that any evaluation of the recent escalation requires us to identify new factors related to current realities. Let us begin with the fact that the confrontation between the two sides this time started in the Tavush/Tovuz region, i.e. far from the administrative borders of Nagorno-Karabakh. This new location has added a further and very thought-provoking dimension to the conflict.

However, this shift of the armed conflict beyond the Nagorno-Karabakh region is not the only new circumstance that needs to be analyzed.

I must at this stage underline the fact that I am not seeking to assert anything with this analysis but only to express possibilities and assumptions that I believe are necessary to this topic’s development, and without which the scope of discussion would be limited and the discussions themselves impoverished.

However, let us start by posing a question which in my view is fundamental: is this new eruption of the conflict linked to attempts to rearrange the region’s energy map?

This question is anything but rhetorical if we consider the fact that three main energy arteries pass through the new region into which the conflict has now expanded, and even a short analysis of their individual significance immediately provides new answers.

We are already very familiar with one of these energy arteries: the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (BTC), which transports Azerbaijani oil to the Mediterranean. The second main artery is the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP), which pumps Caspian gas from Azerbaijan through Georgia and Turkey to Southern Europe, where the pipeline will be connected to the Trans-Adriatic pipeline (TAP) project that will stretch northwards into the heart of Europe. Finally, the third artery is the Baku-Tbilisi-Akhalkalaki-Kars railway line which provides the crucial link of a transport corridor stretching from Europe to China via the Caspian and Central Asia. Even this very brief description of these extremely important links indicates their enormous economic significance for the region; but if we now consider the fact that all three are in direct competition with Russian interests (particularly the first two), it is easy to see why the recent clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan have a clear geopolitical and geo-economic dimension.

At this stage, I would like to bring some figures to our readers’ attention which can help to clarify the general picture. In 2019, Azerbaijan exported 230 million barrels of oil to Europe worth approximately $15 billion, and gas export that year reached approximately 12 billion cubic metres, earning the country a further $2.6 billion. As an exporter of oil and gas to Europe, Azerbaijan has therefore clearly become Russia’s main competitor, and the level of their competition will increase over the next few years when TANAP begins to operate.

Proxy or Else?

Speaking about a “proxy context” of the conflict is a very delicate subject matter and we can only speak of possibilities. The fact that the big picture is continuing to evolve also prevents us from making any affirmations, but some current circumstances and developments can and indeed must be thoroughly discussed.

Let us begin by noting that much has already been written about Russian-Turkish relations and the specificities of their recent ‘partnership’, and this has naturally given rise to many comments. I might have to repeat certain nuances, but in order to formulate the main message, I will refer to the strange, mosaic-like regional ‘quartet’ of Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Russia continues to consider the South Caucasus to be within the area of her vital interests. Indeed, even in the eighteenth century, Potemkin was already arguing that Russia’s destiny was decided to her south. In principle, Moscow’s perception of the situation has remained practically unchanged, but its approach has naturally evolved in practical terms. What is clear is that Russia’s declared interest in the South Caucasus is based upon her exercising sufficient control over the region to maintain her influence and ensure the stability of her southern border region.

But Moscow’s interest in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean is no less strong, and these interests pass through the South Caucasus and the wider Black and Caspian macro-region. Russia’s desire to maintain her powerful influence over Armenia also explains her strategic and political approach to the South Caucasus.

It is no secret that any kind of regional decision or action Yerevan wishes to make or undertake is done in agreement with Moscow. Certain sources explain the events of 12 July according to the same reasoning, and therefore exclude the possibility of any Armenian ‘contingency’ or ‘autonomy’. That said, any responsible attitude towards this issue prevents us from substantiating this consideration.

In parallel, Russia’s regional policy cannot accept Turkey’s recent efforts to establish a certain degree of hegemony over the Black and Caspian macro-region. It is noteworthy in this regard that some researchers see current events as evidence of the Turkish government’s desire to carry out a project of neo-Ottoman ambitions. I believe that the grounds for employing such a bold term are quite debatable, but many essential tendencies of Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies are certainly worth discussing.

In any event, this matter is obviously multifaceted, but what is obvious is Ankara’s readiness to co-operate ever more closely with Baku. This degree of readiness is also linked to several practical tasks: On one hand, Ankara is trying to maintain energy relations with Moscow, as the so-called TurkStream project eminently illustrates. Yet at the same time Ankara’s mission is also to reduce energy dependence on Russia, and in this sense TANAP and other projects contribute to the goal of greater diversification. In general, at both the political and the ideological level, Turkey’s attitude towards Azerbaijan is based upon the declared principle of ‘one nation, two states’.

Recent events are also expected to lead to changes in Azerbaijan’s foreign policy, which for the past two decades has been based upon the goal of maintaining a balance between Russian and Turkish interests. This approach was based upon the belief that, if Azerbaijan was to maintain her internal stability and be able to carry out a regional policy, Baku needed to obtain Russian non-interference as a minimum and Turkish benevolence and support.

At present, it is quite likely though that Azerbaijan will seek to correct her balancing act, especially in the nearest future. The reasons for this correction are likely to be the unsolved territorial dispute with Armenia, Russia’s ambiguous attitude towards this decades-old conflict, the implications of Yerevan’s membership of the CSTO and Turkey’s growing regional role and ambition.

And by the way, when considering the Karabakh conflict and its regional neighbours, one must not forget the energy alliance between Turkey and Azerbaijan. This alliance has been further strengthened by TANAP, limiting the export capacities and profits of Russia’s energy carriers and decreasing Russia’s aggressive ambitions in the region due to a lack of necessary resources. It is impossible that this important element of the regional picture would go unnoticed by the United States and NATO.

See part 2 here.

By Victor Kipiani, Geocase Chair